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The Equality Principle Revisited: The
Relationship of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals to Ake v. Oklahoma
Lee Richard Goebes"
I.INgbaion
At first blush, the United States Sureme Court cases of Dauxn v Merm'
DowPhwmmwdaz&' and A ke v O/= would not seem related? It has been
suggested, however, that the more recently developed Daubvt standard should
affect defense requests for an A ke expert." Why should this be so?
In A ke, the Court, relying on the Fourteenth Amendment, reversed an
Oklahoma trial judge's refusal to provide- at state expense- a mental health
expert requested by an indigent capital defendant who wished to pursue an
insanitydefense' In Dau e, the Court rejected lower courts' practice of excud-
* JD. Candidate, May2003, Washington and Lee UniversitySchool of Law, B.FAt, 1997,
Virginia Commonwealth University, School of the Arts. The author would like to thank Professor
Scott Sundby for providing the inspiration for this Article. He would also Like to thank Professor
Roger Groot and the students at the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse- particularly Cynthia
Bruce, Damien DeLaney, and Edmund Power-for their edits and insights. This Article is
dedicated to my father, Robert L. Goebes, who is retiring from his legal career in 2003, the year of
my graduation and official entrance into the profession.
1. 509 US. 579 (1993).
2. 470 US. 68 (1985).
3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 US. 579,597 (1993) (holding that"Tg]eneral
acceptance' is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence ... do assign to the trial judge the task of
ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task
at hand"); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US. 68, 74 (1985) (holding "that when a defendant has made a
preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a signif want factor at
trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue
if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one").
4. See Paul Giarmelli & Edward Imwinkelried, Sdgiflc Eziabx: Te Fa!atfism S"M
Couts Daision inKumho Tires, GUM. JusT., Winter 2000, at 12,19 (noting that "[Ddvt/Kurmi]
should also affect motions for defense experts underA ke) [hereinafter Giannelli & Imwinkelried,
Faicufmm Kumho].
5. Ake 470 U.S. at 74; seeU.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1. The rather narrow holding has
been extended beyond the capital realm, beyond access merelyto psychiatric experts, and, perhaps
most importantly to this Article, beyond testifying witnesses. See irra notes 111-141 and accompa-
nying text (discussing extensions of Ak4. See gmenmy Carkon Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and an
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ing scientific evidence "unless the technique is generally accepted as reliable in
the relevant scientific comnmunity."6 After Daum, a trial judge faced with
proffered scientific testimony must assess "whether the reasoning or methodol-
ogyunderlying the testimonyis scientificallyvalid and ... whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."'
This Article will explore the relationship between these cases. The Article's
basic premise is this: if the prosecution is seeking to admit expert testimony
pursuant to the standard outlined in Daub4 the defendant will often be entitled
to an expert underAke. Daulrt assumes that the party opposing the admission
of expert testimony is fully able to present its objections and to subject the
proffered expert to the full crucible of adversarial testing. The Daubeit standard
of admissibility requires full and fair adversarial testing of proffered expert
evidence; at bottom, because Daut realizes that judges lack training in science
and the scientific method, Dau/ t assumes that the partyoffering the expert and
the party objecting to the expert are well educated on the subject matter at issue
and able to plead properly and present vigorously their cases for and against
admission. Furthermore, the Dau,?t opinion recognizes that under its standard,
trial courts occasionally will admit some "shaky" or erroneous science.8 The
Dau7t holding, therefore, relies on the adversarial process and the jury system
to sort out the bad science from the good. Criminal defense lawyers, however,
are usually not scientists; defense lawyers need expert consultation to prepare
properly their cross-examinations and challenges to the prosecution's experts.
The reality, recognized byA ke, is that many criminal defendants are unable to
secure the expert consultation and assistance that the Dauen standard for initial
admission- as well as Daulens increased reliance on juries to reject erroneous
science- requires.
The jurisprudential line upon which the Court founded A ke affects A ke's
relationship with Dau,n. Thus, Part II of this Article will trace the cases leading
to Ake. Akds jurisprudential ancestors recognize that there is an "equality
principle" present in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
IrigtDqmdmts RW oanExpt W'kbs A PnmieD i maJrIz , 10 WK. &MARYBILL
RIS.J. 401 (2002) (discussing lower courts' treatment of Ake).
6. Dauhat, 509 US. at 584 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
7. Id at 592-93. Underahulee, the trial judge must understand the rationale underlying the
proffered testimony and must be able to determine whether the testimony was reached through a
proper application of the scientific method. The Du/t Court referred to the trial judge 's role as
that of "gatekeeper." Id at 597. Lower courts, as well as legal commentators, latched onto this
"atekeeping" Language; thus, the trial court's role under Daube is consistently described as that
of "gatekeeper." Sw eg, Magistrini v. One Hour Mar ing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584,
596 n. 10 (D. N.J. 2002) (referring to trial judge's role under Daue as that of "gatekeeper"); Miles
J. Vigilante, Note, SawwnExpt Te&s n /After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 8 J.L. & POL'Y
543, 546 (2000) (describing trial judge's role under Dwden as that of "gatekeeper").




tion; this equality principle requires the government to take affirmative steps to
alleviate the effects of poverty on an indigent defendant's ability to mount fully
a defense. Part III will examine closely the Ake opinion itself, and will address
the extension and application of A ke in the state and federal courts. The A ke
expert, although comnonly(and correctly viewed as a trial sword defendants can
utilize to formulate an aggressive defense, is also properly viewed as providing
a defendant with a trial shield. This latter use is relevant to Ake's relationship
with Daulvt This Part also will examine brieflythe codification of Akebythe
various legislatures.
Part IV will address the standard for the admission of expert testimony
replaced byDAt. It next will examine the Dux t opinion itself, its progeny,
and the way in which Daubert altered the admission of expert testimony. Al-
though the Daubot Court based its decision on its interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, manystate courts have adopted the Dau, t standard for both
criminal and civil cases. Part V will question whether the Damdert standard,
developed in the civil context, should apply wholesale in the criminal arena.
Because the Daubertstandard allows judges to admit more expert testimony,
it expressly requires a full and fair adversarial pre-admission testing of proffered
expert evidence. Part VI, therefore, will address Dauk~es implications to the
process of evidentiaryvoir dire. In addition, the Daubert opinion recognizes that
some erroneous, shaky, and overstated expert testimony will be admitted; the
jury, therefore, is expected to sort out the erroneous evidence and come to a
"correct" decision. Thus, Part VI also will address Daulves failure to screen out
erroneous scientific evidence and the increased importance of a defense lawyer
having expert assistance in her preparation for the cross-examination of the
prosecution's experts. Part VI will also examine the importance of limiting the
impact of expert testimony that- although based on "good science"- needs to
be placed in perspective.
Simply put, if the Daurt standard and process of admissibility is to be
anything more than a perfunctoryexercise, the indigent defendant must have the
abilityto subject the proffered expert to adversarial testing. Moreover, because
the Dauert opinion relies on juries to ignore "bad science," the defense attorney
must have the "basic tools" to rebut the prosecution's experts.' A fair reading
of A keand its progenyprovides the indigent defendant with the expert assistance
assumed by the Dauben Court.
9. The "basic tools" language originated in the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 US. 226,227 (1971), and was expanded on bytheAkeCourt SerAke,
470 U.S. at 77 (citing Bri, 404 US. at 227).
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I. TheRcadtoAle." TbeGriffin/Douglas EquaityP aip e
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has."' 0
"In either case the evil is the same: discrimination against the indi-
gent."
1'
A. Griffin v. Illinois
After being convicted for armed robbery in Illinois state court, Judson
Griffin ("Griffin") filed a motion in the trial court asking that the state provide
him with a copyof the trial transcript at no cost; this motion alleged that Griffin
was indigent and that, under Illinois law, a defendant appealing a criminal convic-
tion niut include a copy of the trial transcript to obtain appellate review.'
Although Illinois law provided no-cost trial transcripts to indigent defendants
convicted of capital offenses, in "all other criminal cases defendants needing a
transcript, whether indigent or not, must themselves buy it."' 3 Griffin argued
that Illinois's failure to provide him with the needed transcript violated both the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
The trial court denied this motion without a hearing."
Griffin appealed the ruling of the trial court to the Supreme Court of
Illinois. 6 He again asserted that the only impediment to a full appellate review
was his lack of funds to purchase a transcript and that "refusal to afford full
appellate review solelybecause of povertywas a denial of due process and equal
protection."' The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected Griffin's appeal without
a hearing." The United States Supreme Court, however, granted Griffin's
petition for a writ of certiorari on the question of whether Illinois's refusal to
10. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
11. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
12. Gnf 351 U.S. at 13.
13. Id at 14.
14. Id at 14-15; se aso US. COMT. amend. XIV, S 1 (tNor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
15. Gri 351 US. at 15. At no point, in either the state or federal proceedings, did the State






provide a trial transcript for a noncapital indigent defendant, when such tran-
script is necessary for appeal, violates due process or equal protection. 9
Illinois conceded that Griffin was indigent and that he needed a transcript
in order to prosecute his appeal; the State nevertheless argued that nothing in the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses guaranteed to Griffin a transcript at the
State's expense. ° The Court, however, rejected the State's contentions. Cting
such diverse documents as Leviticus and the Magna CartaJustice Black's opinion
for the Court noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich... is an age
old problem." " According to Justice Black, in the American system of justice,
this concern for equal justice is embodied in the coordinate concepts of due
process and equal protection.22 Due process and equal protection "emphasize
the central aim of our entire judicial system- all people charged with crime must,
so far as the law is concerned, stand on an equality before the bar of justice in
everyAmerican court."2" Byrefusing to provide Griffin with a transcript, Illinois
discriminated against him for being poor, poverty, however, bears "no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence."'" This denial of appellate access
due to poverty meant that Illinois deprived some indigent defendants of their
liberty through unjust convictions that the appellate courts would have set
aside." Because indigent defendants received less procedural due process
because of their poverty, the Court held that this outcome violated the Four-
teenth Amendment:
[Denying an indigent convict access to appellate review] is a misfit in
a country dedicafed to affording equal jisice to all and special privi-
leges to none in the administration of its criminal law. ere can be
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as
19. Id at 16; see Griffin v. Illinois, 349 US. 937 (1955) (mem.) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari).
20. Gf 351 US. at 16.
21. I
22. I at 17.
23. Id (internal quotations and citations omitted).
24. Id at 17-18. The Gin Court came close to recognizing poverty as a suspect classifica-
tion for equal protection purposes: "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate based on
account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color." Id at 17. The Warren-era Court
flirted with the idea of making wealth- or the lack thereof- a suspect classification for equal
protection purposes. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 US. 663, 668 (1966) ("Lines drawn
onthebasiso ealth or property, like those of race... are traditionally disfavored.") (internal
ciations omitted). The Burger-era Court, however, rejected including "wealth" in the Equal
Protection Clause's list of suspect classifications. Se San Antonio Indep. Sc. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 US. 1,28-29(1973) (rejecting notion that wealth is suspect class for purposes of invoking strict
scrutiny for equal protection analysis).
25. GhJri 351 U.S. at 19.
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adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to
buy transcripts.
26
The Supreme Court, therefore, vacated the decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois." The Court, a full seven years prior to finding in the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments a constitutional right to counsel at state expense,28 had taken
a step towards outlining the equality principle.
B. Douglas v. California
A jury convicted William Douglas ("Douglas") of a thirteen-count felony
information in a California state trial court.' The California District Court of
Appeal affirmed this conviction on mandatoryappeal. 0 Douglas then petitioned
the Supreme Court of California for discretionary review of his conviction; the
California court denied this petition without a hearing."
Although it had established a public defender system, the California legisla-
ture did not automatically provide counsel at state expense for an indigent
defendant on appeal.3 2 Pursuant, however, to the California rules of criminal
procedure, a California court of appeal had the diwotiw to appoint counsel for
an indigent defendant if it determined that the appellant's case was particularly
complicated and that the assignment of counsel would have been of special
advantage to the particular appellant. Douglas had requested the appointment
26. Id (footnote omitted). The Court noted that the Constitution does not require the State
of Illinois "to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all" Id at 18. Because,
however, Illinois had made appellate review available to those convicts who could afford transcripts,
appellate review had "become an integral part of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating the
guilt or the innocence of a defendant." Id As an integral part of the trial system, appelate review
now was subject to the constraints of due process and equal protection; Illinois co not, consis-
tent with the Fourteenth Amendment, exclude indigent convicts from having access to appellate
review. Id
27. Id at 20. The Court, however, did not hold that Illinois was required to purchase a
transcript in every case where the defendant could not afford one. Instead, the Court left it to the
Supreme Court of Illinois to "find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review
to indigent defendants." Id The Court, byway of example, suggested that the Illinois court could
utilize "bystanders' bills of exception or other methods of reporting trial proceedings." Id The
Grp Court's bow to federalism and the state courts to implement the specifics of its holding
would repeat itself in the A kedecision; in the A kedecision, the bow to federalism led to confusion
in the lower courts. See ifm note 110.
28. Swe Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335, 345 (1963) (holding that Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require states to provide counsel at state expense to indigent defendants charged with
felony offenses).
29. Dug6a, 372 US. at 353. At this jury trial, both Douglas and a co-defendant were
represented bya single public defender. Id at 353-54.
30. Id at 354.
31. Id
32. Id at 354-55.
33. Id at 355 (citing California v. Hyde, 331 P.2d 42,43 (Cal. 1958) (en banc)). The test
employed by the California courts to determine whether to appoint appellate counsel was quite
[Vol. 15:1
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of counsel for assistance on his appeals. The California appellate courts, how-
ever, after conducting an independent investigation of the trial record, deter-
mined that the appointment of counsel would have been of little or no value to
Douglas.34 Thus, Douglas was forced to prepare his mandatory appeal and his
petition for discretionary appeal without the guiding hand of counsel.
Douglas successfullypetitioned the United States Supreme Court for review
of the Supreme Court of California's refusal to appoint counsel.3" Returning to
the due process / equal protection logic and language it had employed in G &
the Court, per Justice Douglas, vacated the decision of the lower court. 6 The
Court noted that, under the California procedure, a rich appellant "enjoys the
benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and mar-
shalling of arguments on his behalf" regardless of the appellate court's initial
determination regarding the appellant's case." The indigent defendant, however,
enjoys no such benefits:
[T]he a Helate court is forced to prejudge the merits [of the indigent's
appeal before it can even deterniin6 wtiether counsel should be pro-
ided. At this stage in the proceedings only the barren record speaks
for the indigent, and, unless the printed pages show that an injustice
has been conmitted, he is forced to go without a champion on ap!aL
Any real chance he may have had of showing that -his appew has
hidden merit is deprived him when the court decides on an ex parte
examination of the record that the assistance of counsel is not re-
quired.
3 8
The Court held that such a system violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
39
Similar to its holding in Giffin, the Court's holding in DLuga is grounded
in both due process and equal protection and also in the area in which these two
concepts overlap. The due process concepts of fundamental fairness and a right
to be heard, as well as the equal protection doctrine's mandate that all individuals
similar to the standard the Supreme Court had outlined in 1942 for deciding whether noncapital
defendants were entitled to state-funded defense counsel at the trial level Sw Betts v. Brady, 316
US. 455, 473 (1942) (holding that due process does not guarantee every felony defendant appoint-
ment of counsel at state expense; instead, courts must conduct case-by-case inquiry to determine
whether particular facts and circumstances of specific case and defendant require appointment of
counsel. The Court, on the same day it rendered its decision in Dougs, overturned Be with its
seminal decision in Gidkn;v Wainwri&k See Giderp 372 US. at 345 (overturning Bes, holding that
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that state provide indigent felonydefendants with trial
counsel at state expense).
34. Dot4z, 372 US. at 354-55.
35. Douglas v. California, 368 U.S. 815 (1961) (mem.) (granting petition for writ of certio-
rai).
36. DLug6, 372 US. at 358.
37. Id
38. Id at 356.
39. Id at 358.
2002]
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stand equal before the law, were offended by a system where "the rich man can
require the court to listen to the arguments of counsel before deciding on the
merits, but a poor man cannot."' Recognizing the overlap between equal
protection and due process, the Court stated that there "is lacking that e~whq
dwurx by tbe~&vFcrwA nnvrwhere the rich man, who appeals as of right,
enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law,
and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent... is forced to
shift for himself."41 The Dx4z Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses combine together to form an
"equality principle"- a principle that demands that an indigent criminal defen-
dant's right to due process and an opportunity to be heard not merely become
a "right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has [the right to] a meaningful
appeal."42 The Court, therefore, held that a criminal defendant has the right to
counsel at state expense for his initial appeal of right."
Moreover, the Court in Dok4 seemed to endorse fullythe equalityprinci-
ple at which it earlier had hinted in Grfi Griffin's povertya/ dafu hmd his
access to appellate review. Conversely, the California courts' rejection of
Douglas's request for counsel did not bar his appeal; rather, it just put him at a
disadvantage relative to wealthier convicts. Thus, the Court in Dca@ v read the
Fourteenth Amendment to mandate that states make some effort to minimize
the disparity of resources facing indigent criminal defendants whose poverty
merely had limited their presentation of claims and defenses. Although later
cases would limit this equalityprinciple, the notion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires a prescriptive equality would return in Ake.
C 71xEqui mple 7he(ntqu4EqmlGwntw
Even as the Court was announcing the equalityprinciple, it was limiting its
scope: "Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we
often sustain them."" In his dissents in both G n and Du4a, Justice Harlan
worried about the implications of a rule that seemed to require states to take
affirmative steps to alleviate the effects of financial disparities between rich and
poor defendants. 4 Why ,questioned Justice Harlan, should the state be required
to remedythe effects ofa povertyit had done nothing to cause?' Justice Harlan
recognized that the equalityprinciple the Court announced in Grin and Dauqa
40. Id at 357.
41. Id at 357-58 (emphasis added).
42. Dough, 372 US. at 358.
43. Id at 357-58. The Court, however, limited its holding to mandatory initial appeals of
right and refused to decide whether its holding would require states to provide state-funded counsel
to an indigent defendant seeking discretionary review of her conviction. Id at 356.
44. Id at 357.
45. See id at 362-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gi,% 351 US. at 38-39 (iarlan, J., dissenting).
46. See DLb , 372 US. at 362-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 15:1
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could not mean that the Constitution places an "affirmative duty... to place the
poor on the same level as those who can afford the best legal talent available.""'
Simply put, the equality principle must contain some limits.48
In 1974, Fred Ross ("Ross")- arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
mandates appointment of counsel at state expense for discretionaryappeals from
criminal convictions- discovered at least one limit to the equalityprinciple. The
United States Supreme Court, in Roas vc Mof '49 stated that neither the Equal
Protection Clause, nor the Due Process Clause, of the Fourteenth Amendment
required the appointment of state-funded defense counsel for an indigent
defendant prosecuting a discretionary appeal s In rejecting Ross's claim, the
Court distinguished its earlier decision in Doas by noting that Douglas never
had counsel to review the record of his trial." The State of North Carolina had,
however, appointed counsel for Ross's mandatoryappeal Thus, unlike Douglas,
Ross had already been provided with the guiding hand of counsel. If, however,
one takes the equality principle literally, this distinction is unpersuasive. The
wealthyappellant has the further guiding hand of counsel on discretionaryappeal
but the indigent defendant does not.
Moreover, the Rcss Court attempted to untangle the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provisions conflated bythe Grn and Da4s cases: due process "empha-
sizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regard-
less of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated." 2 Equal
protection, however, "emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between
47. Id at 363 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. Professor Scott Howe argues that the "e ualiyprinciple" is too opn-ended to serve as
a constitutional norm or unifying theory "equali=  y away requires an external substantive standard
for judging what is similar or dissimilar treatment. Sre Scott W. Howe, 7h Tmub& I1qffW cf
Eqwluy in C.anutmd CniPrvumlPim Fnrn Brown toM iranda, Furman ad BeurA 54 VAND.
L. REV. 359, 379-92 (2001). Professor David Harris similarly argues that the equality principle
contains no logical limit and, therefore, is uhimatelyunworkable. Professor Harris asserts that the
Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment are the proper mecha-
nisms to provide the indigent defendant with the resources needed to defend herself in our
adversarial sstem of justice. SwDavid A Harris, The CtntioaridTn*bS&n* A New7lxy
cn Expat Serdm fir Inigat Dqrm, 83 J. GUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469 (1992) [hereinafter
Harris, Tni& Sakd1. Akhough Professor Harris's proposition is intelHectuallyappealing and does
not suffer from the line-drawing problems inherent in the equalityprinciple or the tepidness of the
Ake doctrine, there is no Sixth Amendment precedent to support it. Because it is unli ely that the
Court will provide such precedent in the near future, this Article relies on existing lines of jurispru-
dence, i.e., the Ake doctrine and the equality principle.
49. 417 US. 600 (1974).
50. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,615 (1974) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment does not
require appointment of counsel at state expense either for petition for discretionaryreview by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina or for petition for writ of certiorai to United States Supreme
Court).
51. Id at 608-11.
52. Id at 609.
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classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable." s3 Thus,
the Ross Court refused to note an overlap between due process and equal protec-
tion and retreated from the broad equality notions announced in the earlier
opinions. After Ras, Gi#n merely stands for the proposition that indigent
defendants must have "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly
within the adversarysystem," while Dauglas merelystands for the proposition that
an indigent's appeal cannot become "a meaningless ritual."" Thus, while the
criminal defendant has no right to have her trial or appeal equal that of her
wealthier counterpart, she must have "meaningful" access to justice. But, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require that this access be as "meaningful" as
that of a wealthy defendant.
Although the Rss majorityseemed content to assign the equalityprinciple
to the jurisprudential wastebasket, not all on the Court were willing to bury the
rationale developed in the GiffiDcugas line of cases. Writing in dissent, Justice
Douglas noted that the Court had grounded Duglas in the twin notions of
"fairness and equality." "5 He saw no reason to jettison the equality principle's
place in criminal jurisprudence. 6 Eleven years later, Justice Marshall, who had
joined Douglas's dissent in Ross, would have the opportunity to breath new life
into the equality principle."7
III. Ake v. Oklahormn Tbe Deisin Itsdf its Pogn and its Ca4ia
"We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors
does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary pro-
cess."
5
A. Ake v. Oklahoma
The State of Oklahoma charged Glen Burton Ake ("Ake") with first-degree
murder arising out of his participation in a double homicide. 9 Due to the
strange behavior Ake displayed during his arraignment and other pretrial hear-
ings, the trial judge sua sponte ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist.
The psychiatrist recommended that the court commit Ake to a state hospital for
an evaluation of Ake's ability to stand trial; subsequently, the state hospital
53. Id The Rcss Court also stated- somewhat disingenuously- that the "precise rationale
for the GY and Daz lines of cases has never been expicitlystated, some support being derived
from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process
Clause of that Amendment." Id at 608-09 (footnote omitted).
54. Id at 612 (citing D ,z and Giin).
55. Id at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. Rcss, 417 US. at 619-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57. SeAk, 470 U.S. at 74.
58. Id at 77.
59. Id at 70-71 (outlining facts of case).
60. Id at 71.
[Vol. 15:1
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determined that Ake was unfit to stand trial.6 Several months later, the chief
forensic psychiatrist at the hospital informed the trial court "that Ake had
become competent to stand trial."62 The judge accepted this opinion and
Oklahoma resumed proceedings against Ake.6
At a pretrial conference, Ake's attorney informed the court that he would
present an insanity defense. 6' Although Ake spent nearly three months in the
hospital, the mental health professionals at the hospital made no inquiry into
Ake's sanity at the time of the offense. 5 Moreover, because Ake was indigent,
he could not afford a mental health professional to conduct a retrospective
inquiry into his sanity at the time of the murders.' Ake's attorney, therefore,
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required that the court appoint a psychi-
atrist at state expense.67 The trial judge, pointing to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in UtmStatz ix tul Snith vu Badi, rejected this argument and
Ake went to trial without an expert having ever conducted an inquiry into his
sanity at the time of the homicides.69
Although the various mental health professionals who had examined Ake
during his pretrial hospitalization testified at the trial, "none testified about his
mental state at the time of the offense because none had examined him on that
point."' Thus, neither Ake nor the State were able to present any evidence or
expert testimony on Ake's sanity at the time of the murders." The trial court
instructed the jury that "Ake was to be presumed sane at the time of the crime
unless he presented evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about his
sanity' at the time of the offense."
Although Ake's lawyer argued insanity in his opening and closing argu-
ments, the "jury rejected Ake's insanity defense and returned a verdict of guilty
61. Id; sw aho Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (outining
standard for competency to stand trial).
62. Ake, 470 US. at 71.
63. Id at 71-72.
64. Id at 72. An insanity defense seemed to be Ake's only viable option; there was over-
whelming physical and circumstantial evidence of his guilt. Id at 88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
addition, Ake had provided police with a forty-four page written confession. Id (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
65. Id at 72.
66. Id
67. Id
68. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
69. Ake, 470 US. at 72; se United States e n. Smith v. BaldI, 344 U.S. 561, 568 (1953)
(stating that government has no duty to provide indigent defendant expert assistance at govern-
ment's expense).
70. Ak4 470 US. at 72.
71. Id
72. Id at 73.
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on all counts." 3 At the sentencing proceeding, Oklahoma argued that Ake's
crimes warranted a sentence of death.' The state hospital doctors, who had not
made any investigation into Ake's mental condition at the time of the murders,
testified that "Ake was dangerous to society" and would likely commit further
violent crimes." The prosecution, therefore, was able to present unrebutted
expert testimonythat Ake constituted a future danger.7 The juryagreed with the
assessment of the state doctors and sentenced Ake to death.'
Ake, reiterating his argument that the Fourteenth Amendment entitled him
to expert assistance, appealed his conviction and sentencing." The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Ake's death sentencing and noted, "We have
held numerous times that, the unique nature of capital cases notwithstanding, the
State does not have the responsibilityof providing [expert assistance] to indigents
charged with capital crimes."" The United States Supreme Court granted Ake's
petition for a writ of certiorari's
In a decision written by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Oklahoma court. The Court held that:
e n a defendant has made a preliminaryshowing that his sanity at
the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the
Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's
assistance on i issue if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one."
Reiterating Gifi the Court noted that it "has long recognized that when
a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal
proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity
to present his defense."" This requirement stems from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause's guarantee of fundamental fairness: everydefendant
must be afforded "the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake." " As discussed above in Part II(Q,




76. Ake 470 US. at 73. Future dangerousness was an aggravating factor in Oklahoma's
capital punishment regime. S id at 86.
77. Id at73.
78. Id
79. Ake v. State, 663 P2d 1, 6 (Okla. Cim. App. 1983) (citations omitted).
80. Ake v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984) (mem.) (granting petition for writ of certiora).
81. Ak 4 470 US. at 74.
82. Id at 76 (citing, inter alia, GrA; 351 US. at 12).
83. Id; see US. CONST. amend. XIV S 1; see a/so Medina v. California, 505 US. 437,444-45
(1992) (stating that "(t]he holding inAkecan be understood as an expansion of earlier due process
cases holding that an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to the minimum assistance necessary
to assure him a 'fair oprtunity to present his defense' and 'to participate meaningfully in [the]
judicialproceeding" (quoting Ake, 470 US. at 76)).
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Protection Clause in criminal cases; in fact, the Ake Court expressly disavowed
any reliance on the Equal Protection Clause. 4 Despite this, the Ake opinion
draws heavily on the language and logic employed in the G n / DcxV6 line of
cases. Justice Marshall noted that "justice cannot be eq where, simply as a
result of his poverty, a defendant is denied" the ability to present fully his case
within the adversarial system."5 Referencing, inter alia, GroDa , and Gdm,
Justice Marshall noted:
Meaningful access to justice has been the consistent theme of these
cases. We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse
doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary
process, and that a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State
rocees against an indigent defendant without m g certain that he
to the raw materials integral to the b of an effective
Thus, while the Court has not held must pur-
chase for the indigen defendant all the assistance that his wealthier
counterpart must buy, see Rss ti Mcffat. .. it has often reaffrmed that
fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to an adequate
opportunityto present their claims fairlywithin the adversarysysteni.6
Thus, Ake recognizes that in our adversarial system of justice, the parties to a
criminal case must have some parity of resources. The above quoted language,
84. Ake, 470 US. at 87 n.13 ("Because we conclude that the Due Process Clause guaranteed
to A e the assistan he requested and was denied, we have no occasion tooider the plicability
of the Equal Protection Clause."). The manner inchtheAkemajortyemploysthe "fudamen-
tal fairness" aspect of the Due Process Clause, however, is dearly informed and defined by equal
protection concepts. See David A. Harris, Ake Rewita- Expet Psybioric Wummse Remrin Be)ai
frrkI rnIr, 68 N.C L REv. 763,780-81 (1990) (noting that "[while the right announced
inAkewas based on the due process clause, the opinion contains much equalit)-oriented language")
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter a , Ake R_,ir4 John U. West, Note, Expert Seniz and 5e
Inrir CnbinalD*t /arm 7he C d Man&wre qA v. Oklahoma, 84 M -FLC L REV. 1326,
1336 (1986) (noting that due process's "fundamental fairness" concept has strong equal protection
eeme nt); - so GaryS. Goodpaster, 7 1 I, qrmq,4Ptra i a Dw, Pnxs S tw , andx
indioets Rig~tqCFrmA~zs'to the Q~aos, 56 IOWAL REV. 223, 245 (1970) (noting that "[elqual
protection and due process analyses are virtualythe same when one comes to classifications whicharearguabl f,-amentallyuar in. th tadtaldue proessense"). Thus,ahogh one coul
read A keas a further step in the Court's rejection of the Equal Protection lause's place in criminal
jurisprudence, one also could read it as siplyanother case in whichJustice Marshall conflated and
merged the due process and equal protection concepts; and, therefore, as an attempt bythe Justice
to resuscitate the equality principle so maligned by the Rss opinion. See Richard H W. Maloy,
7l vcd Mxsl and tde Hdy Gna- 7he D P bos Jui pn.ra ofa CmwmreJwut, 26 PEPP. L
REv. 289, 335-50 (1999) (arguing that Justice Marshall's opinions-especially his opinion in
A ke-- reflect Marshalls belief that equalprotection and due process share much common ground).
85. Ake, 470 US. at 76. Lower courts have not failed to notice Akds equal protection and
equalityprinciple pedigree. See, eg, People v. Bass, 577 N.W.2d 667,668 (vfich. 1998) (recognizing
Ake Court's reliance on equal protection principles), at dkia, 525 US. 921 (1998); Husske v.
Commonweakh, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) (asserting that Ake Court relied on both due
process and equal protection concepts), wt daiA, 519 US. 1154 (1997).
86. Ake 470 US. at 77 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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while giving lip service to Rcss, returns to the central premise of the equality
principle: the American system of justice is offended when a defendant, merely
because of scant financial resources, is unable to present fully her case within the
adversarial process. In fact, the American system of justice is so offended that
the state must take affirmative steps to alleviate the effects of this poverty and
provide the indigent defendant with the tools needed to present fairlyher claims.
Applying the due process framework it outlined in Mauhew v Eld i 8 the
Court balanced the three factors relevant to determining what conditions require
a trial court to provide expert assistance to the indigent defendant."3 The Ake
Court noted that the first Mamtew factor- the individual's interest in the accu-
racyof the criminal proceeding- is "almost uniquelycompeling" in the criminal
proceeding where life and liberty are at risk. 9 The Court, therefore, noted that
the first Mathem factor weighed heavily in the analysis and counseled towards
providing Ake with the additional safeguard of the expert.' Citing the second
Manbtew factor, the State of Oklahoma argued that "to provide Ake with psychi-
atric assistance... would result in a staggering [financial] burden to the state."'
The Court, however, summarily rejected the State's contention. Cting the
federal system and several state systems, the Court noted that many jurisdictions
already "make psychiatric assistance available to indigent defendants, and they
have not found the financial burden so great as to preclude this assistance."92
Finally, the Court examined the third Maulxw factor the "probable value
of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk
87. 424 US. 319 (1976).
88. Ake, 470 US. at 77; seMatthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976) (holing that due
process requires courts to balance private interest that will be affected by official action, govern-
ment's interest- including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens- that providing
additional procedural safeguards would entail, and risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest
through procedures currently used and probable value of any additional safeguards).
89. Ake, 470 US. at 78. In fact, the applicability of the Mattx three-pronged test to
criminal procedure is questionable because t criminal process is already "quite consciously
unbalanced in favor of the individual interest." Charles H Koch, A amaity j fnrt in D
Pmzs Gadw, 37 Hous. L REv. 635, 642 n.20 (2000). In other words, unless the requested
additional safeguards are truly outageous, an honest application of the Maurew test almost alwas
counsels for more process and safeguards in the criminal context. For a discussion of the Ake
Court's application of the Mamkew test see Todd E. Pettys, EvdmiyRdnunr MmilyRarunMe
Vm9as, adiJwyN64Ea 86 IOWAL REV. 467,523-25 (2001).
90. Ake 470 U. at 78.
91. Id
92. Id (citations omitted). Some federal courts had, even prior to Ake, been fairly generous
in appointing mental health experts at the government's expense to iigent defendants. SW, eg,
Brinkleyv. United States, 498 F2d 505, 509-11 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that trial court's refusal to
grant indigent defendant's request for appointment of independent mental health examination was
error); United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713,717 (5th Or. 1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (stating
that trial court should grant request for government-funded expert when defense attorney "makes
a reasonable request in circumstances in which he would independently engage such [expert]
services if his client had the financial means to support his defenses') (footnote omitted).
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of an erroneous" verdict if those safeguards are not provided."9 The Courtinitially noted the "pivotal" role that psychiatry plays in the modem criminal
proceeding.9 4 Because the criminal law makes the criminal defendant's mental
state relevant to his culpability and the punishment he might suffer, the "assis-
tance of a psychiatrist maywell be crucial to the defendant's abilityto marshal his
defense."9s The Court noted that mental health experts perform examinations
and evaluations, and gather facts that theycan share with the judge and the jury.96
Mental health professionals can explain complex and arcane concepts to the jury
in an accessible and understandable fashion. In this way, psychiatrists "assist lay
jurors, who generallyhave no training in psychiatric matters, to make a sensible
and educated determination about the mental condition of the defendant at the
time of the offense."
97
The Court noted, however, that psychiatry is not an exact science; thus,
equally competent psychiatrists will often disagree on a patient's mental health
status or, even more fundamentally, on what constitutes mental illness.98 Because
of the potential for disagreement among experts, the Court noted that it was
especially important that a criminal defendant have access to an independent
expert.99 Because the jury remains the ultimate factfinder with respect to mental
health issues, it is crucial that both parties to the litigation be able to present their
cases to "enable the juryto make its most accurate determination of the truth on
the issue before them."l° The Court, therefore, held that if a defendant is "able
to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely
to be a significant factor in his defense," the trial court must appoint such an
expert at state expense. 1 '
The Court also noted, however, that the trial court's decision to denyAke's
request for an expert denied him the "means of presenting evidence to rntb the
State's evidence of his future dangerousness." 10 Here, the A ke Court authorized
the use of the court-appointed expert as a "trial shield" to rebut the State's
93. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981); Madxmw, 424 US. at
335).
94. Ake 470 US. at 79.
95. Id at 80.
96. Id
97. Id at81.
98. Id 'This observation is no less true nowthanwhen it was madein 1985. In fact, pointing
to recently conducted studies, Professor Christopher Slobogin notes that "field research indicates
that mental health professionals involved in everydaypractice mrrydiagrrwe dmn hdfd tineven
on major diagnostic categories such as schizophrenia and organic brain syndrome." Christopher
Slobogin, Duv4s A hm Daubert: PrSikryicArxaza a a GseSo*j4 57 WASi. &LEE L REv. 919,
920 (2000) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
99. Ake, 470 US. at 81.
100. Id
101. Id at 82-83.
102. Id at 83 (emphasis added).
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case- a use analytically distinct from the defense expert as a "trial sword" used
to present a more "offensive" defense such as insanity."3 This authorization is
crucial to understanding the relationship between Dau and A ke.
In Banybt v Estd,' the Court upheld the prosecution's use of mental
health experts to present testimony regarding a defendant's potential for future
dangerousness.'°' In Ake, the Court admitted that in reaching its decision in
BanxZ it relied on the basic "assumption that the factfinder would have before
it both the views of the prosecutor's psychiatrists" and the opposing views of the
defendant's experts, and would, therefore, "be competent" to see anyshortcom-
mgs in the prosecution's case and to reach the correct decision about the likeli-
hood of future acts of violence."° If the adversarial system is to function prop-
erly, the defendant must have access to an expert to assist her in rebutting the
government's case. Therefore, the Court implicitly recognized-that the Four-
teenth Amendment requires that the state provide the indigent defendant with
a defense consultant who will act as a "shield" against the government's use of
expert testimony and scientific evidence. 7 The Daublt case, decided eight years
later, would have implications on the function and duty of the A ke expert as trial
shield.
B. MakigJwtioe Rdmqist's NiWimr a Raio* Lotter Cmnu Interret Ake
In his dissenting opinion in A ke, then-Justice Rehnquist stated:
[E]ven if I were to agree with the Court that some right to a state-
appointed psychiatrist should be recognized here, I would not grant
t1 broad tto accessto a copeent psychiarist who will conduct
an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentaion of the defense .... A psci.a st is not an attowhose job it is to advocate... [A]Il the defendant should be entitled
to is one competent opinion- whatever the witness'
concusion- from a psychiatrist who acts independentlyof the prosecu-
tor's office. Although ithe independent psychiatrist should be available
103. PAuL C GIANNEui &EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRmD, SQENTImCEVIDENCE S 4-5(E), at
229 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that "the [Clourt recognized that Ake encompasses more than a &tYt
defense expert; it requires a aomndtirexpert") [hereinafter GANNELU &IMWIKELRIED, SCJEN-
TIFIC EViDENCF].
104. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
105. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 US. 880, 905-06 (1983) (affirming trial court's decision to admit
prosecution's expert testimony regarding capital defendant's lilmihood of future dangerousness).
106. Ak 470 US. at 84 (cding Bano't 463 US. at 899).
107. St id This "trial shield" is quite different from the "trial sword" also discussed by the
Ake Court. The expert as trial sword is useful in presenting "offensive" defenses- e.g., insanity,
diminished capacity, or duress-while the expert as trial shield is useful for educating defense
counsel on the science being emploed by the prosecution's experts, arming defense counsel with
the knowledge necessary to cross-examine effectively the prosecution's experts, and in convincing
the court, during the process of evidentiaryvoir dire, to reject the prosecutions proffer of scientific
or technical evidence.
[Vol. 15:1
2002] THE EQUALITY PR INCIPLE
to answer defense counsel's questions prior to trial, and to testify if
called, I see no reason why e defen nt should be entitled to an
opposing view, or to a 'defense' advocate.' s
Similarly, Chief Justice Burger, although concurring in the majority's decision,
explicitly limited his concurrence to the facts of the case by stating that lower
courts should limit the Ake opinion to psdxivk assistance in capita cases."°
Despite these admonitions, manylower courts have applied theA keholding
to situations quite distinct fromA keitself. Justice Rehnquist's dissent andJustice
Burger's concurrence have, however, given courts pause when they consider
such extensions and have caused some lower courts to read A ke quite narrowly.
Moreover, the majorityopinion itself precluded a consistent treatment of theA ke
holding by explicitly leaving "to the States the decision on how to implement"
the right announced.
110
For instance, even within the context of defenses based on mental health
issues, the courts have split in deciding what constitutes a proper mental health
expert.' Lower courts have been forced to determine what standard to apply
to a violation of the right announced in A ke n2 The courts have been required
to determine if the ineffective assistance of counsel standard, announced in
StridLwri v Waszh 1" applies to A ke experts. 4 In addition, the courts have
108. Id at 92 (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (internal citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted).
If one takes the equality principle seriously, Justice Rehnquist's dissent misses the mark The
wealthier defendant is not precluded from employing an expert witness who acts as a defense
consultant; thus, according to and (especially) D6s, the indigent defendant must have
some similar ability. Sesupm notes 12-43 and accompanying text.
109. Ake, 470 US. at 87 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
110. Id at 83. This bow to federalism mirrored the G nCourt's decision to leave to the state
courts the discretion to "find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to
indigent defendants." Grf 351 U.S. at 20; seeaso s"ra note 27. Moreover, the Court's subse-
quent refusal to grant certiorari in a number of cases involving the right announced in A ke further
compounded the confusion. Se Bailey, su"r note 5, at 414-20 (discussing cases involving Ake
claims in which Court refused to grant writs of certiorari and arguing that Court's refusal to grant
ceriorari in these cases has added to confusion amongst lower courts).
111. CklwpoeLindseyv. State, 330 SE.2d 563, 565 (Ga. 1985) (holding that onlyps&imi~ t
satisfies A kds mandate that defendant have access to mental health expert), uiz Funk v. Common-
wealth, 379 SE.2d 371, 373-74 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting defendant's claim that examination
bycn;icalpsyd t-as opposed top/dit- violated mandate of Ake).
112. Sw eg, Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502,1515-16 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying "harmless
error" analysis to Ake violation, inquiring as to whether violation had "substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict") (internal quotations and citations omitted);
Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1292 (8th Cr. 1994) (applying harmless error analysis to Ake
violation, inquiring as to whether violation was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt"), ai
513 U.S. 995 (1994).
113. 466 US. 668 (1984).
114. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984) (setting forth standard for ineffective
assistance of counse; U.S. COMs. amend. VI (guaranteeing right to counseD. Lower courts
generally have held that an expert cannot be "ineffective" in the Sixth Amendment, StrLidsense
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been faced with the question of whether- Justice Burger's concurrence in A ke
aside- the A ke right extends to noncapital defendants.'
Most importantlyfor this Article's purposes, the courts have been required
to determine whether the right announced in Ake entitles defendants to experts
other than mental health professionals. In Cadudi u MississqA1pi 16 the Court
rejected a capital defendant's claim that the trial court's refusal to appoint a
fingerprint expert and a ballistics expert violated the mandate of Ake."' The
Gddudl Court, however, noted that the defendant had "offered little more than
undeveloped assertions that the requested [expert] assistance would be benefi-
cial.""' Thus, CQ/dudi does not hold that the Constitution never requires the
appointment of experts other than mental health professionals. Most courts, in
fact, have concluded that the principles announced in A ke extend well beyond
mental health experts and have consistently held that the Constitution requires
the appointment of a wide variety of nonpsythiatric experts for indigent defen
dants. 9 These cases, of course, are crucial in applying the Ake doctrine to the
of the word. So-, eg, Poyrer v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1419 (4th ar. 1992) (holding that there is
no cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of expert witnesses), wt dait4 506 US. 958 (1992).
The failure of a lawyer to request an Ake expert may, however, form the basis for a Sixth Amend-
ment ineffectiveness claim. See Woods v. State, 59 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding
lawyer's failure to request Ake expert constituted reversible Sixth Amendment error).
115. Most courts have determined thatAkedoes applyoutside the capital murder arena. See
eg, Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th ar. 1987) (holding that principles announced
in Ake equally apply to noncapital cases), wt deim4 487 U.S. 1210 (1988); State v. Barnett, 909
S.W.2d 423, 427-28 (Tenn. 1995) (holding that Ake extends to noncapital defendants, collecting
cases); Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) (recognizing that Ake extends
to noncapital cases), wt denia4 519 U.S. 1154 (1997). BatseeBradford v. State, 512 So. 2d 134, 135
(Ala. Cxim. App. 1987) (holding that A ke does not extend beyond capital cases). For an examina-
tion of courts' treatment of A k's applicability to noncapital cases, as well as an argument that Ake
should apply there, see Amber J. McGraw, Note, L tw nt Liln. A n Asssnmt q Nwmita1
IraigEtDqdreaz 'R b toExpertAssistan Underthe Ake v. Oklahoma Dowxnp 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
951 (2001). SeealsoWest, s~ra note 84, at 1345 (arguingthatrighttoAkeexpertis coextensive with
Sixth Amendment right to counsel). But if Darryl K. Brown, Crinml Pivawe Entidwnms,
P erfsniandLwyEmiNorm, 61 OHIOST. LJ. 801,825-29 (2000) (discussing reasons whytrial
judges might be unwilling to extend Akeright to defendants facing less serious charges).
116. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
117. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n. (1985) (rejecting defendant's contention
that trial court's refusal to appoint ballistics and fingerprint experts at government expense violated
Fourteenth Amendment).
118. Id at 323-24 n.1.
119. So? eg, Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Ar. 1987) (holding that Ake
opinion extends beyond psyciiatric witnesses, stating there "is no principled way to distinguish
between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts"), t daie 487 US. 1210 (1988); Dubose v. State,
662 So. 2d 1189, 1197-99 (Ala. 1995) (extending A ke to nonpsychiatric witnesses and holding that
indigent capital defendant was entitled to DNA expert); Cade v. State, 658 So2d 550,555 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (recogniing that Akeextends to sychiatric witnesses); Polk v. State, 612 So.
2d 381, 393-94 (iss. 1992) (noting that Ake entled indigent defendant to DNA expert at state
expense); Tibbs v. State, 819 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Okla. CAim. App. 1991) (noting that Ake"must
necessarilybe extended to include anyexpert which is necessaryfor an adequate defense"); Husske
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Dautrt standard.
In another area highly relevant toA kes relationship with Daulen the lower
courts have struggled with whether the Ake expert must be an independent,
def~nse-loyal expert, or whether the appointment of a neutral expert- whose
findings are available to both the prosecution and the defense- satisfies the
mandate ofA ke 20 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist counseled against
interpreting A ke as giving rise to an independent expert who would function as
an "advocate" for the defense."' Instead, Justice Rehnquist argued that the
majority's opinion requires no more than an examination by a neutral witness
whose findings are available to both the prosecution and the defense.12 TheA ke
majority, however, explicitly stated that for the adversarial system to function
properly, the jury must have before it "both the views of the prosecutor's
[experts] and the cpaing 'es of the defendant's [experts]."1 23 This language
strongly supports the notion that the Ake expert is to be a partisan defense
advocate.124 Most lower courts, therefore, have held that while an indigent
defendant does not have the constitutional right to the expert of her choice, only
an independent, defense-loyal expert satisfies the mandates of due process and
the Ake opinion. 12  For example, in Snib v McCobmi&,126 the Ninth ircuit
v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) (holding that Ake requires appointment of
experts conversant in fields other than mental health), aet dm;A 519 U.S. 1154 (1997).
120. CQpn Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185, 191 (5th ar. 1989) (holding that appoint-
ment of neutral expert "whose opinion and testimony is available to both sides" satisfies mandate
of A ke, cat daini 495 US. 963 (1990), uib5 Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153,1158-59 (9th Cr.
1990) (holding that "under Ake, evaluation by 'neutral' court psydiatrist does not satisfy due
process," collecting cases), wnt dvdi 522 US. 965 (1997).
121. Ake 470 US. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
122. Id (Rehnquistj, dissenting).
123. Id at 84 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
124. SeeWest, s"- note 84, at 1347 (arguing that language of Ake opinion dictates that role
of Akeexpert should be that of partisan advocate for defense); seealoNfichaelJ. Todd, Case Note,
CmirimlPr iant- DzePsnxz,srdIh tDya,: Exw1re FwrdnmaIFanm w toIn&&dR&,t
toExprtAssistamr Ake v. Oklahoma, 29 HOw. LJ. 609,621 (1986) (same).
125. Sw, eg, Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1290-91 (8th Car. 1994) (holding that neutral
expert does not satisfydue process), amt dai 513 US. 995 (1994); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d
926, 929 (10th Car. 1985) (holding that appointed expert must be independent from prosecution);
Christyv. Horn, 28 F. Supp. 2d 307,321 (WD. Pa. 1998) (holding that "neutral" expert does not
satisfymandate of Akeand statig that "defendant is denied the essential benefits of an expert when
the services of the doctor must be shared with the prosecution"); Polkv. State, 612 So. 2d 381,393-
94 (Mdiss. 1992) (holding thatA keexpert must be independent from prosecution). Illustratively, the
Starr court compared the expert required byA keto the counsel required bythe Sixth Amendment
and Gidhv; like the appointed lawyer, the appointed expert must function as a partisan advocate on
the behalf of the criminally accused. Star, 23 F.3d at 1291. BuseKordenbrockv. Scroggy, 889
F.2d 69, 75-76 (6th Or. 1989) (suggesting that appointment of neutral expert satisfies mandate of
Ake), x-dd aergmai, 919 F2d 1091 (6th Or. 1990) (en banc); Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d
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reasoned that if the defense is required to share the conclusions of the Ake
expert with the prosecution, competent counsel might forgo altogether expert
evaluation out of fear of harming her client."' The Snith court, therefore, held
that A ke requires that defense counsel have the abilityto consult with an expert
regarding possible defenses and possible weaknesses in the prosecution's case
without disclosing the expert's findings to the prosecution."' Such a reading of
Ake seems inevitable given the adversarial nature of our criminal process."2
Snitb, and other opinions that reach the same conclusion, require that the Ake
expert become a true member of the defense team and, therefore, dictate a larger
role for the A ke expert in the Dault framework
Lower courts must also decide whether a defendant may request an Ake
expert in an ex parte hearing. In dictum, the Ake Court stated that when a
"defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing... that his sanity is
likelyto be a significant factor... the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is
readily apparent."o The A ke Court, however, ultimately left "the decision on
how to implement" the right to the lower courts; thus, although most courts
follow the A ke dictum and allow indigent defendants to make theirA ke requests
ex parte, some do not."
185,191 (5thCr. 1989) (holding that appointment of neutral expert "whose opinion and testimony
is available to both sides" satisfies mandate of Ake), wt dmia4 495 US. 963 (1990).
126. 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Ar. 1990).
127. Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153,1159 (9th Car. 1990), wt daieA 522 U.S. 965 (1997).
128. Id
129. As noted by the Supreme Court with respect to the Sixth Amendment right, if the
criminal justice process "loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitu-
tional guarantee is violated." United States v. Cronic, 466 US. 648,656-57 (1984). Although the
CmrmcCourt made this statement in respect to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, while the Ake
right to expert assistance is grounded in due process concerns, both the right to counsel and the
right to expert assistance are necessaryto ensure compliance with the Constitution's mandate that
the criminally accused have a meaninf opportunity to present a complete defense within the
strictures of our adversarial system of justice. Se Crane v. Kentucky, 476 US. 683, 690 (1986)
("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . .. or... the Sixth Amendment... the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
130. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.
131. Cqmxv State v. Apek, 861 P2d 634, 650 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (holding that defendant
has no right to ex parte hearing to request expert assistance), wt dvia, 513 U.S. 834 (1994), and
State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242, 255 (S.D. 1992) (finding no right to ex parte hearing to request
expert assistance and stating that state should be involved when public funds are being spent), and
Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 566, 571 (Va. 1993) (finding no constitutional right to ex
parte Ake hearing), on adklrga ,w, 512 US. 1217 (1994), uh Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d
114, 120 (Ala. 1996) (holding that "an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to an ex parte heang
on whether expert assistance is necessary'), and Brooks v. State, 385 S.E2d 81, 84 (Ga. 89)
(holding that indigent defendant's request for expert assistance should be made ex pane), wit
494 US. 1018 (1990). SeegmUy Thomas Bassett, TheNesityofEx PanevPn forrent
Cinaim Donts, 55 J. MISSOURI B. 32 (1999) (arguing that Constitution requires that defendant
requesting Ake expert must be permitted to make request ex parte). The Ake issue aside, some
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Courts that allow an indigent defendant to make an ex parte request for
expert assistance have the better argument: when a defendant is forced to make
her request in front of the prosecution, she necessarily reveals trial strategy and
information about her defense. In fact, the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
in State v Bafxmd,' 2 held that ex parte A ke hearings are comtkmi=14 mandated
because "[a] hearing open to the State necessarilyipinges upon the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination.""' In addition, because a defendant may
choose to forgo altogether expert assistance ratherthan reveal sensitive materials
and trial strategy, a court that denies an exparte request for appointment of an
Ake expert risks precluding the defendant from making a proper and complete
investigation of the strength of the prosecution's case and the strength and
existence of any available defenses. Such an outcome has the obvious potential
to reduce the accuracy of the criminal process. 3 Furthermore, courts that deny
indigent defendants an ex parte request for the appointment of an expert ignore
the equality principle that the Ake decision reaffirmed. A wealthy defendant
simply can hire an ex rt without any court involvement; the wealthy defendant,
therefore, need not =close any information or trial strategy to the prosecution
in retaining the necessarydefense services.' Honest application of the equality
principle demands that the indigent defendant be granted the same opportunity
for expert assistance- free from prosecutorial involvement- that her wealthier
counterpart enjoys.
36
Manylower courts note that the A keopinion also requires courts to appoint
experts to act as "trial shields," even though the Ake opinion itself focused on
the expert's role in asserting the sword-like defense of insanity. In Moor vu
Arnp,"3' the court stated that the Ake expert could be used kct to present a
legislatures, in codifying the right to expert assistance, have provided that defense requests for
expert assistance can be made ex parte. Sa eg, D.C CODE ANN. S 11-2605(a) (1995) ("Counsel
for a person who is financiallyunable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for
an adequate defense may request them in an ex pate application. ); ThNN. CODE ANN. S 40-14-
207Q') (1997) ("In capital cases where the defenlant has been found to be indigent... such court
in an ex pate hearing may, in its discretion, determine that investigative or expert services ... are
necessary to ensure that the constitutional rights of the defendant are propery protected.").
132. 428 S.E2d 178 (N.C 1993).
133. State v. Ballard, 428 S.E.2d 178, 180 (N.C. 1993).
134. Sw People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1322 (Cal. 1987) (noting that ex parte requests
for experts "free he defense from the course it otherwise would have to steer between the Scylla
of p applying for needed funds and in so doing disclosing some of the defense to the
prosecution and the Charybdis of keeping the defense secret but, in so doing, foregoing the
necessary [expert assistance]") (citations omitted).
135. Moreover, the prosecution obviouslydoes not need to obtain court approval in order to
retain expert assistance.
136. . State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423, 428 (Tenn. 1995) (noting that courts should not
force indigent defendants to reveal defense theories in order to gain appointment of expert
assistance when wealthier defendants are under no such requirements).
137. 809 F.2d 702 (1lth Cr. 1987).
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defense and to "aid defense counsel in confronting the prosecution's case ...
[and] its expert witnesses.""' Similarly, in UnitadStat5 v Slam, 9 the court stated
that the Ake expert is not limited to the presentation of sword-like defenses."
If she can make out the requisite showing of need, defense counsel is entitled to
use the A ke expert to assist in the interpretation of the findings of the prosecu-
tion's experts and to aid in the preparation of their cross-examination 41 As
discussed in Part VI, this conception of the Ake expert as a trial shield is crucial
to understand the interplaybetween the A kedoctrine and the adversarial Dauyt
standard for admissibility of expert testimony.42
Finally, the A ke Court stated that a trial court should appoint an expert
when the defendant is able to make a "threshold showing" that she requires such
assistance.143 As noted by the Supreme Court of Alabama, however, the Ake
Court did not specifically state what this "threshold showing" entails.'" The
lower courts have been forced, therefore, to flesh out the meaning of "threshold
showing" and determine what standard a defendant requesting an A ke expert
must satisfy before she is entitled to the requested assistance.
The various courts have set standards ranging from quite difficult to more
lenient. On the one hand, some courts have required a defendant seeking
appointment of anAke expert to show that the expert would be "critical" to the
defense and that the expert would testifyto science subject to varying opinion.145
Other courts, however, merely require that a defendant seeking appointment of
an expert showthat the requested expert would be of "material assistance" to the
defendant and that denial of the expert would result in the trial being "unfair." "
At bottom, the "threshold showing" required bymost courts seems to boil down
to the defendant showing that (a) the expert would assist the defendant with an
138. Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702,709 (11th Car. 1987), a. dffia 481 US. 1054 (1987).
139. 776 F.2d 926 (10th Cr. 1985).
140. United States v. Sloan, 776 F2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985).
141. 1,d; swalo United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 637 (7th OJr. 1989) (noting that Ake
expert "can assist in preparing the cross-examination of... experts retained bythe government"),
wt daznia4 493 U.S. 982 (1989).
142. Se bfm notes 254-288 and accompanying text.
143. Ak 4 470 U.S. at 82.
144. Moxxfy 684 So. 2d at 119.
145. SeScott v. Louisiana, 934 F2d 631,633 (5th Cr. 1991) (stating that expert should only
be appointed if expert's testimony is "both 'critical' to the conviction and subject to varying expert
opinion") (internal quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, the Tenth (rcuit has stated that.
courts should only appoint experts when the underlying science or subject matter "may well be
decided one wayor the other. It must be [a subject] that is fairly debatable or in doubt." Liles v.
Saffle, 945 F.2d 333,336 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted), at daiat 502
U.S. 1066 (1992).
146. Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920,925 (Va. 1996) (stating that in order to obtain
appointment of expert, indigent defendant must demonstrate that "the services of an expert would
materially assist him in the preparation of his defense and that the denial of such services would
result in a fundamentally unfair trial"), wt de 519 U.S. 1154 (1997).
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issue relevant to her case; (b) the need for this expert assistance is more than
merelyhypothetical;1'7 and (c) the failure to appoint such an expert would result
in prejudice or an unfair triaL4 As discussed below in Part VI, a proper under-
standing of the DauAbt standard can greatlyincrease defense counsel's ability to
make out the requisite "threshold showing."
49
C 71MCa4saliw cfk
As recognized bythe AkeCourt itself, several states, as well as the federal
government, provided soni amount of expert assistance to indigent defendants
even prior to the Ake decision."s In addition, in the wake of Ak, various
legislatures enacted statutes to provide indigent criminal defendants with expert
assistance."1 These statutes vary in their scope and may provide more or less
access to expert assistance than A ke itself.
2
The various state and federal statutes varywidelyin their scope and are too
manyto analyze individuallyin this Article; the reader should note, however, that
many legislatures have codified in sonic manner the Ake right."53 By way of
147. In otherwords, the defendant must showmore than merely"undeveloped assertions that
the requested (expert] assistance would be beneficial" Cdud4 472 US. at 324 nl.
148. S,4 eg, Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240,1244 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that "defendant
must show a reasonable probabilitythat an expert would aid in his defense, and that denial of expert
assistance would result inanunfairtra), wt deia 487 US. 1210 (1988); Dubose v. State, 662 So.
2d 1189,1192 (Ak 1995) (stating that defendant must showa reasonable probabilirythat an expert
would aid in his defense and that the denial of an expert to assist at trial would result in a funda-
mentally unfair trial"); Tibbs v. Stare, 819 Pi2d 1372, 1377 (Okla. Gim. App. 1991) (stating that
defendant must show "specific need" for requested expert assistance).
149. See ifm notes 254-303 and accompanying texL
150. SeA ke 470 US. at 78 n.4 (collecting state sutaues that provided for some type of expert
assistance to indigent criminal defendants). TheAkeCourt also noted that Congress had provided
for the appointment of some expert assistance to indigent individuals facing federal criminal charges
with the passage of the 0iminal Justice Act of 1964. Id at 79-80, see 18 US.C S 3006A (2000)
(setting forth Criminal Justice Act of 1964). For an examination and analysis of the terms of the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, and a discussion of the Act's effectiveness, see Fred W. Bennett,
Touwd E 1 BwSt R en enJwa, I- Irlnif D as r Expvt Sem ani dan
AdbareDqee LAw& CONrEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 95, 126-32.
151. SeegmmdlyBaley, sup note 5, at 457.
152. Of course, the existence of a statute providing for expert assistance does not preclude
the operation of Ake in other words, a defendant may seek appointment of an Ake expert even if
an applicable statute would provide a similar righlt. SeShruti S. B. Desai, Article, E diiw pita
PRpmenivn 4rj eMenyRadi&nt 13 CAP. DEF.J. 251, 269- 70 (2001) (discussing possible
tactical reasons whyAke expert maybe preferable to statutorilyprovided experts).
153. Sea, eg, ALA. CODE S 15-12-21(d) (Supp. 2001); GA. GODE ANN. S17-7-130.1(1997);
IDAHO CODE S 19-852(a)(2) (Mlchie 1997); IND. CODE S 35-36-2-2 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
S 31.185 (NMchie Supp. 2002); MiSS. CODE ANN. S 99.15-17 (1999); MONT. GODE ANN. S 46-14-
202(1) (2001); NM. STAT. ANN. S 31-16-3(A) (Mlchie 2000); OHIoREV. CODE ANN. S 2929.024
(West 1997); ORREv.STAT. S 135.055(3)(a) (2001); R.I.GEN.LAWSS 12-17-8 (2000);TENN.CODE
ANN. S 40- 14-207(b) (1997); UtAH CODE ANN. S 77-32-301(3) (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, S
5231(2) (1998); VA. CODE ANN. 5 191-264-3:1 (Mlchie 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. S 29-21-6
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example, Virginia Code Section 192-264.3:1 provides expert assistance to a
capital defendant when the defendant's mental condition is relevant to capital
sentencing.154 Obviously, this statute only applies to mental health experts and
only provides assistance to capital defendants; conversely, the interpretation of
Ake given by the Supreme Court of Virginia provides wider assistance than its
statutorycounterpart ss The standard the defendant must meet to obtain expert
assistance under Section 19.2-264.3:1 is, however, far easier to meet than under
any judicial interpretation of Ake under Section 192-264.3:1, the defendant
merely must show that she is charged with capital murder and that she is indi-
gent. 56 Once the court appoints an expert pursuant to Section 19.2-264.3:1,
however, all reports generated by this expert must be provided to the attorney
for the Commonwealth.1 7 Use of an expert appointed pursuant to Section 19.2-
264.3:1, therefore, risks "exposing the defense mitigation theory in pretrial
discovery"
158
The Oregon legislature has also codified the Ake right."59 Section
135.055(3)(a) of the Oregon Revised Code provides that a "person determined
to be eligible for appointed counsel is entitled to necessary and reasonable
expenses for investigation, preparation and presentation of the case." '6l The
Oregon courts have interpreted the statute to emphasize the expert's utility as
trial shield. For example, in State v G/wen 161 defense counsel, defending an
indigent defendant against charges of manslaughter, requested "a medical expert
to assist him in reviewing voluminous medical records, preparing for cross-
examination of the [prosecution's] experts and evaluating possible defenses.
" ' a
The trial court denied this request; however, the Oregon Court of Appeals
reversed. 16  The appellate court stated that the trial court's decision denied the
defendant the opportunityto prepare effectivelyhis defense: "This case involved
complex medical issues beyond the legal expertise of [the] defendant's attorney.
(Michie 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. S 7-11-303 (Mchie 1995). Sw gwmmy GIANNELU &
IMWHNKELRIED, SaENIFIC EVIDENCE, s,*ma note 103, at 5 4-4 (discussing state statutes that
provide expert assistance to indigent defendants).
154. VA. CODE ANN. S 191-2643:1 (lfchie 2000) (providing for expert assistance when
capital defendant's mental condition is relevant to capital sentencing). The Virginia General
Assembly passed this statute in 1986, in the wake of the Ake decision.
155. Swe Haskg 476 S.E2d at 925 (holding that Ake requires appointment of experts




158. Desai, sp-a note 152, at 270.
159. OR. REV. STAT. S 135.055(3)(a) (2001).
160. Id
161. 785 P.2d 376 (Or. CL App. 1990).




The availability of an expert medical witness was vital for adequate trial prepara-
tion ... and in developing effective cross-examination." 6' In other words,
Section 135.055(3), as interpreted by the Oregon courts, has codified the Ake
expert as "trial shield."
As illustrated by the Oregon and Virginia statutes, the right to expert
assistance provided byvarious statutes varies greatly from state to state and may
vary in important ways from the right to expert assistance guaranteed byAke.
Counsel, therefore, should examine the relevant statutory scheme operating in
their particular jurisdiction and determine whether a statutorily-provided expert
or an expert appointed pursuant to A ke would be more beneficial.
IV. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals:
Its Histox A dqmm and Progeny
A. Befoe Daubert" 7h U T&Wp y qcfGe A atzepw=
In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
issued a short, cryptic opinion that addressed the admissibility of expert testi-
monyregarding the "systolic blood pressure deception test.""6 This test, admin-
istered to a defendant in a homicide proceeding, allegedly measured changes in
the blood pressure of the test subject- blood pressure changes "influenced by
change[s] in the emotions of the wimess."'" The machine allegedly measured
blood pressure changes accompanied by the giving of "conscious deception[s]
or falsehoods." 67 In other words, the systolic blood pressure deception system
was a simple lie-detector test.
The defendant, James Alphonzo Fre ("Frye"), wished to present the
testimony of an expert witness who had administered the test to the defendant;
the defendant apparently had shown no change in systolic blood pressure when
questioned about his involvement in the charged crime.'" The prosecution
objected, the trial court sustained the objection, and Frye was convicted."69 The
D.C Circuit, noting that the "systolic blood pressure deception test" had not yet
"gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs,"affirmed
the trial court's decision.17° This standard for the admissibility of expert testi-
mony became known as the "Fr standard" or the "general acceptance" test.""
164. Id
165. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,1013 (D.C r. 1923). The citation-free Fre opinion
spans all of two pages in the Federal Reporter.
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id at 1014.
169. Id
170. Id Se reuUySHEILAJASANFF,SaENCE ATT1-E BAR. LAW,SaENCZ,ANDECHNOL-
OGY IN AMERICA 61 (1995) (discussing FrA.
171. Se Daut, 509 U.S. at 585-90 (discussing Fry or "general acceptance" test); see also
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Although the Fe case went relativelyunnoticed at first, by"the mid- 1970s, Frje
was almost the only test that was used to screen the admissibility of novel
scientific theories or techniques, in state and federal courts alike.""7 Bythe late
1980s and early 1990s, however, courts and commentators had begun to criticize
heavily the Fe standard. 
173
One criticism was that the Fe standard let scientists and the scientific
community- rather than judges, lawyers, and the legal system- determine the
admissibility of scientific testimony. The scientific community, in deciding
whether to accept or reject a particular theory, idea, or scientific test, dictated
whether that theory would be adnitted."4 Moreover, because the Fr)e standard
precluded the admission of a scientific concept that, although "correct," had not
yet gained the requisite general acceptance, it seriouslyimpeded the admission of
novel scientific concepts that might- after the prosecution was over or the
statute of limitations had expired- ultimately gain acceptance.17 One judge
colorfully noted:
I suppose that Christopher Columbus could never have been qualified
as an expert to render an opinion on circumnavigation, and the Wright
brothers would never have been able to testify as experts and give
opinions relating to flight because, for much of their day, their views
never gained general acceptance within the scientific community 76




In addition to precluding the admission of novel scientific theories, the Frye
standard seemed to be fundamentally at odds with the more liberal admissibility
standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE ").7 1 Simply put, the lower
courts were having trouble reconciling Fre with the FRE and with the more
JASANOFF, s"pm note 170, at 61.
172. RIaIARDLEMPERTETAL,AMODERNAPPROACHTOEVIDENCE 1040(2000) (citations
omitted); see also David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael J. Saks, Glx& Yor Costa BaU/at rd
Cav e Dom; Plasue Expklg d Pat, Urn at)ig d5 PnZe and Wong A vJg t tbe Fuaue of
SdenzifcEtidwz, 15 CARDOZOL.REv. 1799,1808 (1994) (statingthat "[though of little importance
at the time it was decided, and barelynoticed for decades afterwards, the Fryetest eventuallybecame
the icon for... the admissibility of scientific evidence") [hereinafter Faigman, Porter & Saks].
173. SeePETERW.HUBERGAUILEO' REVENGE: JUNK SCENCE INThE COURTROOM 14-17
(1991).
174. SseJASANOFF, supra note 170, at 61-62 (discussing criticism of fact that Frye standard
allowed scientific community, rather than legal community, to determine admissibilit); HUBER,
supra note 173, at 15 (noting that "Fr)e seemed to give mainstream science the final word" in
determining courtroom admissibility of scientific evidence).
175. SeeHUBER, supra note 173, at 16.
176. Rubanickv. Witco Chem. Corp., 576 A.2d 4,15 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1990) (Stern,
J., concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
177. HUBER, s"pra note 173, at 16.
178. S~eJASANOFF, sspr note 170, at 62.
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modem views of science that had developed since the Fr)e decision.' 9 In fact,
by the early 1990s, a circuit split had developed regarding the continued validity
of the general acceptance test.' Thus, in 1992, the United States Supreme Court
granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in order to address the growing dissatis-
faction."'
B. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
The Dauent case involved the use of expert testimony to prove causation
in a toxic tort case."' The parents of Jason Daubert, a child born with severe
birth defects, brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals ("Merrell
Dow"), the maker of Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug Jason's mother
had taken during pregnancy"' Merrell Dow, contending that there was no
competent evidence showing a causal link between Bendectin and birth defects,
moved for summary judgment.' 4
In response, the plaintiffs proffered the testimony of several experts.85
These experts testified that theyhad conducted both in vitro and animal studies
that showed a link between Bendectin and birth defects.8 6 The plaintiffs admit-
ted, however, that the results of these studies were not conclusive and, standing
alone, could not raise "a reasonablydisputable juryissue regarding causation." 18
The plaintiffs' experts, therefore, had conducted a "reanalysis" of earlier epidemi-
ological studies that had found little or no connection between Bendectin and
birth defects; the plaintiffs' experts, after recalculating data from these earlier
studies, found a strong link between Bendectin and birth defects.' Merrell
Dow, however, argued that the "reanalysis" technique used by the plaintiffs'
179. SeVigilante, s"p note 7, at 558-63.
180. Id; seeakoDaub&4 509 US. at 585 (describing split in federal courts of appeal.
181. SevDaubertv. MerrellDowPharms., Inc., 506 US. 914 (1992) (mere.) (granting petition
for writ of certiorari).
182. Sea/v!uyDAVID L. FAiGMAN, LEGAL ALQCJmEy: THE LSE AND MISUSE OF SaENCE
IN THE LAW 61 (1999) (discussing Dauber case) [hereinafter FAIGMAN].
183. DoAdm, 509 US. at 582. Doctors widely prescribed Bendectin during the 1960s and
1970s for morning sickness. S&FAIGMANs"ma note 182, at 61. For a discussion of the litigation
surrounding Bendectin see Joseph Sanders, FnrnSdare toEiddrw The Tsanimy on Caaeim in
Ber/eiz Qss, 46 STAN. L REV. 1 (1993).
184. Daudl 509 US. at 582.
185. Id at 583.
186. Id In vitro studies are studies conducted in test tubes, as opposed to studies conducted
in animal or human subjects.
187. Id at 584;s a/soFAIGMANsipa note 182, at 61.
188. D ud, 509 US. at 583. The plaintiffs' experts "used a 'meta-analysis' to combine the
slight but statisticallyinsignificant effects found in the other studies and claimed to find statistically
significant results." FAIGMAN, shlra note 182, at 61. Although "[t]his research method is not




experts failed the Fre standard.'" The district court agreed with Merrell Dow
and granted summary judgment."9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, utilizing the Fr)e
standard, noted that the reanalysis utilized bythe plaintiffs' experts had not been
generally accepted in the relevant scientific conmmunity 91 Although the Nith
Grcuit agreed that the technique of subjecting prior epidemiological studies to
reanalysis was generallyaccepted byscientists, it noted that the scientific commU-
nityonlyaccepted the condusions of such a reanalysis when the results had been
subjected to "verification and scrutiny by others in the field." 92 Because the
reanalysis of the Bendectin studies conducted by the plaintiffs' experts had
undergone no such "verification and scrutiny," the Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court's grant of summary judgment."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.' Justice Blaclmun,
writing for the majoritynoted that, although it was still accepted bymanycourts,
the Fre standard had come under increasing attack 9 Rather than discuss the
"content" of the Fry standard, however, the Court concluded that Congress had
superseded the Fre test with "the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence."' 96
The Court recognized that the FRE set forth a liberalized standard for the
admission of evidence. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, "If scientific ...
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness ... may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." 97 Nothing in the FRE mentions the "general acceptance" standard,
and "a rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the liberal
thrust' of" the FRE.'9 The Court, rejecting the defendant and amici's' conten-
189. Laulda 509 US. at 584. In fact, over a decade later, the results of the reanalysis
conducted by the Dauberts' experts still have yet to be published or subjected to peer review.
FAIGMAN, sq note 182, at 61.
190. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570,576 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
191. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cr. 1991).
192. Id at 1130-31.
193. Id at 1131 (stating that -[pJaintiffs' reanalyses ... were unpublished, not subjected to the
normal peer review process and generated solely for use in litigation").
194. Daubert v. MerrellDowPhanms., Inc., 506 US. 914 (1992) (me.) (gratingpetition for
writ of certiorar); Dn 509 US. at 598 (vacating decision of Ninth arcuit and remanding case).
195. Dat4 509 US. at 585; sasos"ranotes 172-180 and accompanying text. The fact that
Justice Blackmun wrote the majorityopinion is ilhstrative of the fact that in the early 1990s, Justice
Blaclmun was considered to be the Court's leading authorityon science. JASANOFF, su"ra note 170,
at 63.
196. Da ule 509 US. at 587.
197. Id at 588 (internal quotations omitted); sw FED. R. EVID. 702.
198. Dat 509 US. at 588.
199. Various parties, supporting both the plaintiffs and the defendant, filed twenty-two amicus
briefs in the Ddt case. Id at 598 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
These amicus briefs addressed a wide variety of topics that incuded the proper definition of
scientific knowledge, what constitutes the scientific method, howto ascertain scientific validit, and
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tions that the FRE had "somehow assimilated" the Frye standard, held that
Congress, in passing the FRE, had overruled the "austere standard" announced
in Fr~J2m
After holding that the FRE had replaced the Frye standard, the Court
proceeded to set forth a framework through which trial courts could judge the
admissibilityof proffered expert evidence. 1 Justice Blackmun noted that under
the FRE, expert evidence must be both "science" and "lknowledge." 2° In order
to qualify as "scientific knowledge," the knowledge must "be derived by the
scientific method."20' 3 The scientific method entails generating a hypothesis and
testing this hypothesis to see if it is false.2'° Quoting from an amicus brief
submitted by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the
majority stated: "Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the
universe. Instead, it represents a prooss for proposing and refining theoretical
explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refine-
ment. 20  The majority, therefore, told district courts faced with scientific
testimonyto analyze the process through which the testimonywas generated; in
other words, the expert's ultimate conclusions were not nearly as important as
that underlying process.2" When faced with a proffer of scientific testimony, the
trial judge must, therefore, make a "preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid," that
is, whether it was generated bythe scientific method, and "whether that reason-
ing or methodologyproperlycan be applied to the facts in issue" in the particular
case.2°
the proper role of peer review. SeeJASANOFF, s"qma note 170, at 64 (setting forth excerpts from
various amicus briefs in Dadet case).
200. Dadxv 509 US. at 589.
201. Idat589-90. Increatingthis newframreworkjusticeBlackmm attemptedto replace the
simplistic FrA standard with a standard based on a more 'modem" understanding of the scientific
enterprise. Whether he penned an opinion representative of modem scientific thought is, however,
open to debate. SernayJASANOFF,sqm note 170, at 63 (stating that Damu& opinion is muddled
lacks a philosophica lycoherent framework); David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Jwk
Pk sc fSdm: TrPadx qfExpe arni ,ta it y = FanI Cla, 57 WAS- & LEE
LREV. 685,736-47 (2000) (discussing whether Daulv majority came to correct understanding of
modem scientific inquiry).




206. Id at 595. See Svoa&Uy Kenneth J. Chesebro, Takig Dauberts Fow" Seiai/r 7z
MriX/Ced* a ionDis6a ; 15 CARDOZo L. REV. 1745 (1994) (discussing Daukns focus on
distinction between experts' conclusions and experts' methodology).
207. Das& 509 US. at 592-93.
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Although the DauW4 majority was "confident that federal judges possess
the capacity to undertake this review," it outlined four factors that will often be
pertinent."' The first factor is whether the theory or technique can be or has
been tested; in other words, whether the proffered testimony is subject to
falsification.309 The second factor is whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication.21 Unlike the Fr7 test, however,
publication and peer review are not mandatory to admissibility under Daulwn.
Rather, because "submission to the scnrtiny of the scientific community" in-
creases the "likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected,"
publication and peer review are a relevant- but not dispositive- consideration
in assessing the admissibilityof proffered scientific evidence.21 The third factor
is the "known or potential rate of error" of the methodology underlying the
testimony and "the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation.""' In other words, the Dadvtt majoritycounseled lower
courts to reject scientific testimony when the methodologyused to generate the
testimony has a high error rate."' Finally, the Court recognized that the trial
courts should look to whether the particular methodology has attained "general
acceptance" with the relevant scientific community.214 Although the Court made
it clear that "general acceptance" is not dispositive of the issue of admissibility,
acceptance or rejection bythe relevant communitycan be an important factor.2 "
Finally, the Court addressed the concern- voiced by Merrell Dow and
various amici- that "abandonment of 'general acceptance' as the exclusive
requirement for admission will result in a 'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries
are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions."21' Ile
Court rejected such concerns bypointing to the adversarial process. Judges will
be aided in their role as gatekeepers by partisan advocates who will present
"contrary evidence," thus rendering trial courts fully informed and able to come
208. Id at 593. Semer//yGIANciZu &m IN.RIE,SaEMNIFICEVIDENCE, s"r note
103, at S 1-7(B) (discussing factors outlined byDadut Court).
209. Daknm 509 US. at 593. In aneffortt give his definition some philosophicalcredibility
Justice Blhcmkn supported his definition of the scientific method bypoitmig to the works of Karl
Popper. Id ( The criterion of the scientific status of a theoryis its falsif'ability, or refutability, or
testability.") (citing KARL POPPER, CONJECn.mS AND REFtrAMOM: THE GRowt- OF SaEf
TFICKNOW DGE 37 (1989)).
210. Id
211. Id at 593-94.
212. Id at 594 (citations omitted).
213. SeFAIGMAN, sra note 182, at 63.
214. Dau/dv 509 US. at 594.
215. Id
216. Id at 595-96.
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to the correct decision on the reliability of proffered testimony. 7 Moreover,
although the Court conceded that the trial courts will occasionally admit errone-
ous or "shaky' science, "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof" will ensure that such
testimony will not prevent the jury from reaching the correct determination. 21"
As illustrated below in Part VI, the Court's reliance on the adversarial process has
important implications for the A ke framework.219
C What Effat Has Daubert Ra* yHad?
The Dait opinion is quite broad and ambiguous. Dlfs mandate that
217. Id at 596.
218. Id
219. Although the Dadet decision is an analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
majoriys reliance on "modem" understandings of science made the Dauht standard attractive to
the state courts. SwGianneli & Imwinkelried, Fa/aefminKumho, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that,
although "Dadvt is not binding on the states ... numerous [state] jurisdictions have rejected Fre
in favoroftheDw deapproach"). The D udtstandard's interaction withA keis, therefore, critical
in many-- if not most- jurisdictions.
Although they occasionally cite to Dadvt when reviewing the admissibility of expert
testimony, eg, John v. Im, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696-98 (Va. 2002), Cotton v. Commonwealth, 451
S.E.2d 673, 680 (Va. C. App. 1994), the Virginia appellate courts have not adopted officially the
Daxvtstandard. In addition, although the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that it is appropri-
ate for the trial courts to amidr whether a particular technique is generally accepted, it has also
expressly refused to adopt the Fre test. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va.
1990), mt dv4 498 US. 908 (1990). Instead, when faced with a proffer of scientific testimony,
the trial courts must ascertain whether the scientific method underlying such testimonyis "reliable."
Id; see also Satcher v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E2d 821, 835 (Va. 1992), at daed, 507 US. 933
(1993) (reiterating reliability standard outlined in Spa. In addition to the "reliabilit require-
ment, the Virginia appellate courts have pointed to several"fundamentalrequirements" that should
be met before a trial court admits expert testimony. Se Tsttsworth v. Robinson, 475 S.E2d 261,
263 (Va. 1996) (collecting cases concerning expert testimony and stating that proffered expert
testimony "cannot be speculative or founded upon assumptions that have an insufficient factual
basis," and that expert must have considered all of "the variables that bear upon the inferences to
be deduced from the facts observed"). Swgm 4 CH-ARLES E. FRIEND, THE LAWOF EVIDENCE
IN VIRGNIA S 14-1-S 14-15 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing Virginia courts' treatment of expert test-
mon. Thus, although the thesis of this Articl is not directly applicable in Virginia, the inquiry
into the "reliabilkyof the scientific method" underlying the proffered testimonyrequired bySpaar
and Sawdfis analogous to the Daulutstandard.'In addition, the Supreme Court of Virginia recently
has hinted at an increased role for the Dxmdv standard. In; 559 S.E.2d at 697-98. In In; the
defendant argued that evidence introduced by the plaintiff failed the Daukn standard. Id at 696.
Because the Imcourt found the disputed expert testimonyinadmissible for other reasons, it did not
"reach the merits of the issue whether that evidence also failed to meet the criteria for scientific
reliability articulated in Dz&t" Id at 697-98. The court, however, noted "that we have not
previously considered the question whether the Dodin analysis employed by the federal courts
should be applied in our trial courts .... Therefore, we leave this question open for future
consideration." Id at 698.
2002]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
scientific expert testimony must be based on "scientific knowledge" does not
provide much guidance to the lower courts. Initially, some lower courts treated
the four factors outlined in DwAn as mandatory. For example, in Bdkfiky v
Ge, ora/E/zric Ca,n ° a district court stated that in making its admissibility deter-
mination, it was bound to consider all of the four factors outlined in DaunYvt
In Kw& Tim Q v G 2 2ArA however, the Court made clear that in order for
expert evidence to be admissible, trial courts need not analyze scientific evidence
under all- or even any-- of the four objective factors outlined by the Dardet
majority."' Rather, the trial court must determine whether the factors outlined
in Daxdit would be helpful in determining the admissibility of the particular
expert's testimony n4 If the district court determines that any or all of the
Dau/e factors are not helpful in a particular case, it need not apply them."' The
Kunho Court thus reemphasized the wide latitude granted to the district courts
in Dau rt A district court, in determining whether proffered testimony qualifies
as "scientific knowledge," can consider anyand all factors it deems relevant. This
wide latitude was also broadened in GamraEkoic Ca v jaw,226 in which the
Court held that appellate courts must apply the "abuse of discretion" standard
when reviewing a district court's application of D awIvt2 7 Thus, not onlydo the
district courts possess wide discretion in determining whether proffered testi-
monyqualifies as "scientific knowledge," the appellate courts maynot reverse the
trial courts'resolution of admissibilityissues unless a ruling is "manifestlyerrone-
ous."
228
Common sense suggests that the Daulot standard renders admissible more
evidence than did the Fr; standard it replaced. Realistically, however, the DxAukt
220. 980 F. Supp. 818 (D. VI. 1997).
221. SeBelofskyv. Gen. Elec. Co., 980 F. Supp. 818,821 n.2 (D. VI. 1997) (stating that trial
judges are bound to consider all four factors outlined byDadwr Court when deciding admissibility
of expert testimony).
222. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
223. S&-Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 US. 137, 151 (1999) (noting that four factors
outlined byIladvt majoity were not mandatory or exhaustive, rather the factors were "meant to
be helpful, not definitive"). SiegmdyViglame, sa note 7, at 570.78 (analyzing Kaoadecision).
224. KYnko, 526 US. at 152-53.
225. Id The Kunhm Court also held that the Dadue standard applies to all expert or technical
testimony, not merely to "scientific" expert testimony. Id at 149. See pwUy Giannelli &
Imwinkelied, FaffmfitiKumho, supra note 4, at 13-14 (discussing Xsmo Courts extension of
Dan/en standard to non-scientific experts).
226. 522 US. 136 (1997).
227. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 US. 136, 146 (1997) (holding that appellate courts must
review trial courts' admission of expert evidence under "abuse of discretion standard).
228. Id at 142 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Dauhdr Jne, and Ksmir
opinions have come to be known as the "Dx&r tilogy."
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standard, "[r]ather than making it easier or more difficult... to get... scientific
testimony admitted into evidence," appears mainlyto give "federal courts more
control over the admissibility issue, rather than deferring under Fr)e to the
scientific community."m In other words, the new standard empowers the legal
system itsdfto determine the credibility of a particular body of science. Whether
the criminal justice system is up to this task is the focus of the following Part.
V. SdeneintheLaw: Sh cddDaubert Apply
in de Cm d Sntt?, or, Wly do Caovs Use tx Same Starmdm
for dx A dnwibay qfExpert E mvd in t x and Crinnl Rear?
[Tihere are important differences between the quest for truth in the
courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclu-
sions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must
resolve disputes finally ad quickly. The scientific project is advanced
bybroad aid wide-ranging considration of a multiud of hypotheses,
for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that
in itself is an advance. Conjectures [however] are of little use... in the
project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment.2"
The legal system relies on the scientific communityto assist it in resolving
cases. 3 In fact, science is often absolutely crucial in legal disputes.2 2 As the
above quote from the Da*&lt opinion demonstrates, however, the scientific
communityand the legal communityhave quite different goals. The legal system
needs to resolve disputes quicly and finally, science is under no such pressures
or time-based constraints." The scientific community can alter its views on a
topic as further studies are conducted, conversely, the legal system "cannot
postpone a decision by choosing to wait for more evidence."234 A fundamental
229. JAMES A. HENDERSON, ETAL, THE ToRTm PRcxESs 113 (1999). In other words, the
"meaning" of the Dadwtstandard depends, to a large extent, on the predilections of the particular
judge. SirJASANOFF,s ma note 170, at 63 (stating that D dves "mixed message... invited others
to carify what Justice Blacknnm had left ambiguous"). Sejemufly Lewis H Larue & David S.
Caudil, Pest. Trib'&jS m din the Cav n W1w are dxeJwe Dd., 13 J. Ov. LIG. 341 (2002)
(oudining lower courts' divergent treatment of Dadvt standard).
230. Dauhn 509 US. at 596-97.
231. SgmuLySaENCANDLAW:ANESSENTIALAUIANCE (WulijmA. Thomas ed., 1983).
232. SwFAIGmANszpranote 182, at39-44 (Illustrating legalsystem's dependance on science).
233. SreJASANOFF,s"qmz note 170, at 9 (discussing different goals and constraints of legal and
scientific inquir).
234. Id For a humorous, et insightful lookat the differences between lawand science, as well
as the legal systems dependance on the scientific community, see Howard T. Markey, Lawand
Sdmz A D n cmUarkdezma inSaENCE ANDLAW: ANESSENTIALA IANEC 1-14 (William
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disconnect exists between the ways in which science and law approach problems.
Science recognizes that its theories are subject to constant revision and alteration;
law recognizes that it must resolve disputes now. 3 The legal system must,
therefore, recognize that at least some of the science upon which it is resolving
its disputes will, in time, be rejected as erroneous bythe scientific community.2 6
In other words, the scientific community will not cease from inquiring into the
validity of the scientific opinion upon which a legal dispute was previously
resolved.
Like other areas of law, the criminal justice system relies heavilyon scientific
study and evidence. In fact, most "cases involving criminal charges entail some
aspect of scientific evidence and forensic science. The criminal justice system,
however, is different from other areas of law- the criminal justice arena is the
only area of law in which an individual's liberty or even life are at stake. Thus,
we must decide whether we are willing to deprive the criminal defendant of her
life or liberty based on scientific evidence that ultimatelymayprove to be false.3
A. Thomas ed., 1983) (presenting hypothetical dialogue between "Science" and "Law").
235. SeeJASANOFF,sa note 170, at 9 (noting difference between scientific and eal inquiry,
stating: "Because the law needs closure, the process of legal fact-finding is always bouned in time
.... [The law] must take a position based on the facts at hand, however premature such a decision
mayappear in the eyes of scientists'); swako Alexander K Capron, Daubert and de Qutfor VaIe
Fre "SdamycK /ui i e Cavmx, 30 U. RIca L. REV. 85, 86 (1996) ("Science is oriented
toward the truth but its claims are presented tentatively and are subject to refutation .... In
contrast, the law is oriented toward the just resolution of cases rather than tuth-finding; verdicts
must be rendered even when information is incomplete.")
236. This disconnect between the legal and scientific modes of inquiry seems to undergird
Judge Jed Rakoff's recent decision declaring the Federal Death Penalty Act unconstitutional See
United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (SD.N.Y. 2002) (holding Federal Death
Penalty Act unconstitutional under Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because it deprives
defendants of ability to show actual innocence based on yet-to-be-developed scientific techniques
or yet-to-be-discovered evidence); see 18 U.S.C S 3591-3598 (2000) (setting forth Federal Death
PenaltyAct). Seegim= yPhilip R Yoon, Case Note, 15 CAP.DEF.J.293 (2002) (analyzing United
States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). In an earlier opinion in the Qkirw case,
Judge Rakoff stated:
In constitutional terms, the issue is whether- now that we know the fallibility of our
system in capital cases- capital Runishment is unconstitutional because it creates an
UnduerisktHatameaningfnunberof innocent pesons,bybg put to death beforethe emergence of the te nues or evidence tha will estalish hfieir innocence, are
thereby elfectively deprived of the opportunity to prove their innocence.
United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416,418 (SD.N.Y. 2002). In other words, a scien-
tific technique that has yet-to-be developed may eventually exonerate the criminally convicted;
if, however, the government has already executed the defendant, the defendant is unconstitu-
tionany deprived of the benefit of this technique.
237. Gil Sapir & Mark Giangrande, Pt to Inti tari Tet iBni A lormlxMadfims: Ssrpidrn
A i't/ t,33 J. MASHAL L REv. 1,4 (1999).
238. q. Q naw, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
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The Supreme Court developed the Daubt standard in a series of civil
cases- specifically, toxic tort and products liability cases. Despite Dau-d's tort
law pedigree, most lower courts have applied the Daknd standard in criminal
cases.239  The Dauber Court, however, recognized that the lower courts will
occasionally admit some erroneous or "shaky" scientific testimony2 ° While we
might be comfortable with a civil verdict based on shaky or erroneous science,
why should we accept such an outcome in a criminal case?241 The American
criminal justice system is premised on the idea that "it is better that ten guilty
persons escape than that one innocent suffer."242 Whythen should we applyto
criminal cases a standard for the admissibilityof expert evidence developed in the
lower-stakes realm of tort law- especially a standard that fully recognizes that
some testimony based on faulty science will be admitted?24
The response, of course, is the adversarial system Unlike the Fryestandard,
239. Sw, eg, United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 276-77 (1st Cr. 1995) (applying Dadt in
criminal case), wt da& 516 US. 953 (1995); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.
Mass. 1999) (appln Da.dvtlwjo standard in criminal case). Se geoudy Giannelli &
Imwinkelried, Fa/1wtfiun Kumho, s"ra note 4, at 15-19 (discussing trial and appellate courts'
application of DauhdKurhd standard to criminal cases).
240. Dtd, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
241. SergmdyPaul C Giannelli, Sd&iEtidbmin CkutOiQii d Caes, 33 ARiz. ST. LJ.
103 (2001) (discussing expert testimonyin civil and criminal cases) (hereinafter Giannelli, CidandCrinma i.
242. 4 WILAMBLACXSTONE, OJmENTAFIES *358.
243. Justice Blaclmu's dissent in & aqxr Estdle seems to recognize the appropriateness of
applying a different standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence in the criminal and civil
arenas. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 US. 880, 916-38 (1983) (Blacmunun, J., dissenting). In &iqfzt themajority upheld the trial courts admission of ps)yhiatric expert testimony regarding a capital
defendant's future dangerousness. Id at 905-06. Writing in dissent, the future author of Dtode
stated:
The Court holds that ps.ciatric testimony about a defendant's future dangerousness
is admissible, despite the fact that such testimonyis wrong two times out of three..
In the present state of psycitric knowledge, t is too much for me., One mayaccept this in a routine lwuit for money damges, but when a persons life is at
stake- no matter howheinous his offense- a requiemen of greater reilityshould
pe vaiL. In a capitl case, t speius testimony of a psia. colored in the eyes
of a impressionble, jur by the inevble le utouchby of amedical specialist's
wors, equates wit deat itsel.
Id at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Despite his concerns in Banfr i Justice Blackmun did not
except the criminal justice systemfrom the standard he outlined in Dauvt SeDaniel W. Shuman,
Expeie in Law Mai xr Hmafrk?, 26 J. HI ATh POL POV'Y & L 267, 282-83 (2001)
(discussing interplay between Banqt and Dauxd positing whether Supreme Court intended
DWauh to be applied in criminal litigation, and caustically noting that "[a]lthough it might be
thought at least as important to avoid erroneous capital punishment or lengthy incarceration as it
is to avoid erroneous wealth distribution, the junk science debate has all but ignored criminal
prosecutions") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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which "was easyto apply and required little scientific sophistication on the part
of judges," 2" the Daulbt standard requires judges to become "amateur scien-
tists."24s The Daubm Court, therefore, relied on the adversarial system to assist
judges in their role as "amateur scientists," as well as to assist lay juries in their
role as the ultimate finders of fact. The DxAuiv Court expected the adversarial
system to enable the trial court to fulfill properlyits gatekeeping function and to
empower the jury in its role as rejecter of junk science. The Daukrt Court
assumed that the lawyer opposed to the admission of expert evidence will present
the trial court with the case against admission; this lawyer will present- most
likely through her own expert, or through a cross-examination prepared with
expert consultation- the reasons whythe trial court should deem her opponent's
expert inadmissible under Davt.2 6 Similarly, on those occasions when the trial
judge admits shakyor erroneous science as evidence, the jurysystem serves as the
final check. "[v]igorous cross-examination [and the] presentation of contrary
evidence" will enable the juryto make up for the judge's admission and reject the
erroneous science.24
On its face, this reliance on lawyers and the adversarial process to assist trial
judges in their gatekeeping role and to empower juries in their role as the gate-
keeper's corrector is not troubling. In fact, such reliance on lawyers and the
adversarial system is well founded in the civil realm in which the Court an-
nounced and developed the DxAe standard. In the moneysaturated world of
the civil tort, access to expert assistance, consultation, and testimony is 'not
difficult to obtain.248 The civil lawyer, whether representing the plaintiff or
defense, when faced with an expert proffered by her opponent, likely will have
the resources to hire experts of her own- experts to act as consultants and
244. Faigman, Porter & Saks, s"uim note 172, at 1808; seealso FAIGMAN, s"pm note 182, at 62
(noting that under.Frye the trial judge 'need not understand any of the science; he or she must
merely identify the pertinent field in which the science falls and survey the opinions of scientists in
that field"). Of course, the F7standard does require judges to resolve occasionallysome less-than-
clear issues. SeeJASANOFF, s"qz note 170, at 62 (noting that Frw requires judges to resolve the
sometimes-difficult question of what constitutes the relevant scientific communiryfor the specific
issue and then further to decide how much agreement is enough to establish the requisite general
acceptance within this community).
245. Daubt, 509 US. at 601 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(describing sarcastically trial judge's role under majority's opinion as that of "amateur scientist").
246. See i at 595-96. See gnordy Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc- EpisridqgandL pIPmzs, 15 CARDoZoLREV. 2183,2199 (1994) (noting
that expert assistance is required in order for generalist judges and lay juries to understand technical
and scientific testimony and evidence).
247. Dazdwn, 509 US. at 596.
248. SwGiannelli, Ci/andGin&n supm note 241, at 110 (recognizing that civil lawyers have
considerable access to expert assistance).
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experts to testify at the Daut admissibility hearing and before the factfinder.49
Thus, with the aid of expert assistance, the civil lawyr will be able to mount an
effective challenge to her opponent's proffered expert at the Dauwt hearing and,
if her opponent's expert's evidence is nonetheless admitted, will have the re-
sources to mount an effective campaign to discredit this evidence in the eyes of
the jury.
As Ake made apparent, however, readydefense access to expert assistance
is scarcer in the criminal realm, especially if the defendant is indigent.2" In
contrast, the criminal defendant's adversary, the government-funded prosecutor,
"has access to the services of state, county, or metropolitan crime laborato-
ries"- such services "include both the examination of evidence and the court
appearance of the expert.""' The post-Dauwt civil world is, therefore, funda-
mentally different from the situation commonly present in the criminal justice
system.2s"
This Part asked whether the Daidvt standard should apply to the criminal
arena. If the playing field were trulylevel- if the indigent criminal defendant had
access to the expert assistance the Dauvt standard requires and
assumes- courts' applications of the Daubltstandard in criminal litigation would
not be troubling. Various studies, however, reveal that there is a chasm between
the quality and amount of expert assistance available to the prosecution and the
quality and amount of expert assistance available to the indigent criminal defen-
dant.253 Absent some external mechanism, therefore, the safeguards relied on by
249. See id
250. SeAke 470 US. at 77;seabsoLEMPERT, ETAL,s" rnote 172, at 1035 (noting that Jack
of resources often prevents defense access to expert assistance).
251. Giannelli, GOd inan sigma note 241, at 110; seealso LEMPERT, ETAL,s s" note
172, at 1035 (noting that in many criminal cases *[te only experts who are called testify... (for]
one side- the prosecution- and the defense makes no serious attempts to challenge their conclu-
sions, or no attempt at all. The basic reason for this one-skied presentation is lack of resources");
Douglas W. Vick, PbmbueJzti U, flailn DeL) eS,&u andA dtayDaeb Sewt ,
43 BuFF. LREv. 329,391-94 (1995) (setting forth fidings of several studies that reveal inadequate
defense access to expert assistance).
252. See Gianneli, Cikd ni C s"gm note 241, at 110 (noting that "[a]ccess to expert
testimony is [a] major difference between criminal and civil cases").
253. See id at 111 (setting forth results of several recent studies that show great disparity of
resources between appointed defense counsel and prosecutors); Vick s" note 251, at 391-94
(discussing studies that reveal inadequate defense access to expert assistance). In addition to such
empirical studies, anecdotal observations bear out this disparityof resources: JackWeinstein, Senior
District Court Judge for the Eastern District of New York, has noted that in the federal court
system, even with the existence of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, it can be diffictlt "for some
parties- p i*ent ciminaldefendants- to obtain" expert assistance. JackB. Weinstein,
Sau emal and*e CgJ~l ofExpm Tnm* in dx Coamomi 77 OR. L REv. 1005,1008 (1998); see 18
US.C S 3006A (2000) (codifying C-iminalJustice Act of 1964).
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the Daukt Court to preclude the admission of and reliance on erroneous science
are likely to fail and faulty or overstated science is likely to infect the indigent
criminal defendant's trial
VI 7eEquty Pr*xipleReuisitek If the Prt eutm
is Pri i an Expert Pursuant to Daubert, I amA skigfor an Expert Unier Ake.,
A. Assistig Gatxea . Wbey Daubert
HaI g Iia dreeAke himp
In 1999, the Innocence Project reconstructed s-ixtytwo cases in the
United States of the sixtyseven exonerations in North America to
determine what factors had been prevalent in the wrongful convictions
A third involved tainted or fraudulent science."
Underthe Daukt standard, the trial judge needs to understand the method-
ologythat undergirds the proffered expert's opinion."' As noted byChiefJustice
Rehnquist in his partial concurrence and dissent, however, judges are not scien-
tists.2 6 A trial judge is unlikely to have the basic knowledge necessary to deter-
mine whether a particular expert's testimony passes the Dauent standard.57
Thus, the DAn standard requires that the party offering the expert and the
party objecting to the expert are well educated on the subject matter at issue and
able to educate the trial judge on the underlying subject matter so that the trial
judge can determine properly the admissibility of the proffered testimony.
When the prosecution seeks to introduce expert testimony, the trial court
normally will hold a Daubet hearing."8 During the DAuert hearing, the parties
254. BARRY SC-IECK, ET AL, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246 (2000).
255. Se Sapir & Giangrande, ss"a note 237, at 15 (noting that Dwm&a "heightened the need
for judicial awareness of scientific reasoning and methods"). Compare this observation to the Fre
standard. Under FrA the trial judge "need not understand any of the science; he or she must
merely identify the pertinent field in which the science falls and survey the opinions of scientists in
that field." FAIGMAN, s*m note 182, at 62.
256. Dawd 509 US. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
257. SwFAIGMAN, s"r note 182, at 64 (acknowledging that "it might verywell be true that
judges todayare not well trained to evaluate science"); fJASANOFF, s"gra note 170, at 5 ("Lacking
adequately trained gatekeepers, the legal system allows itself, in the view of some critics, to be
swamped by'junk science.').
258. Se Thomas F. Loti, E iry Voi Dir, THE QIAMPIoN, May 2002, at 26, 27-28
(describing Dau/a hearing and presenting defense counsel with tips for successful handling of
prosecution experts); seasoJAsANM,s"a note 170, at 58 (discussing process of admitting expert
testimony). Because the rules in most jurisdictions require the partyproffering an expert witess
to provide her opponent with a written sumnary of the expert's opinions, the basis for these
opnions, any available reports, and other materials, the lawyer seeking to preclude the admission
of the expert is able to review the findings of her opponent's expert, thereby preventing trial by
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for both sides question the proffered expert.2 9 In addition, the party opposed
to the admission of the proffered expert's testimony may present expert testi-
monyof its own.' 60 The purpose of this hearing is to provide the trial court with
the knowledge it needs to determine whether the proffered expert's testimonyis
admissible.
To cross-examine properlyan expert proffered bythe prosecution, defense
counsel will need to be well educated on the underlying technical subject matter
at issue. 61 Most lawyers, however- similar to most judges- are not scientists
and, therefore, lack the requisite scientific training or knowledge to cross-exam-
ine adequatelythe prosecution's proffered expert witnesses. 62 Moreover, unlike
her civil counterpart, the criminal defense lawyer often is unable to hire an expert
witness to educate her on the science that her adversary is seeking to persuade
the court to admit.263 Understandably, defense attomeys, hobbled bya lack of
expert consultation, "rarely do more than minimally review the qualifications of
the expert and verify the facts on which the expert's conclusions are based."2"
Of course, the wealthier criminal defendant suffers from no similar monetary
constraints and is able to retain the type of expert services envisioned by the
DAmi Court.16 A defense attorney representing a wealthier client, therefore,
is able to submit the prosecution's proffered scientific evidence to the crucible
of cross-examination envisioned by the Daulvt Court.
Although this potential for a lack of adversarial testing based on the wealth
of the criminal defendant was unfortunate under the Fr)e regime, it is simply
intolerable under Derau. In fact, it "is a misfit in a country dedicated to afford-
ambush. SeSapir & Giangrande, s"pnh note 237, at 36.
259. Sw Liotti, s"qma note 258, at 26.
260. SaeDauAxv 509 US. at 596; swaso United States v. Mitche, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262, 263
(ED. Pa. 2002) (descriing Daule hearing); Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor CoG, 83 S.W.3d
483, 489 (Ky. 2002) (describing Dadea hering).
261. Again, contrast this to the situation under Fr under Frfe a defense awr can, by
counting noses, challenge a proffered prosecution expert whose testmonyis not generallyaccepted.
262. SeFAIGMAN, s"p note 182, at 54 (noting that 'most lawyers have little or no apprecia-
tion for the scientific method and lack the ability to judge whether proffered research is good
science, bad science, or science at all"); Sapir & Giangrande, su p note 237, at 34 (noting that most
lawy)er lack "the adequate scientific backgrund to argue ... the admissiblityof expert testimony"(internal quotations and citations omitd)
263. SwGiannei, Ci i ar v1s r note 241, at 110-11 (noting lack of expert resources
for defense counsel representing indigent criminal defendants).
264. Sapir & Giangrande, s"pr note 237, at 34 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
265. SwPaulC.Gianneli, 7eDNA Swry AnAk umdweVinq88J.CU LL.&RmNoL-
OGY 380,417 (1997) (reviewing HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLooD CRIED Our: A PROSECUrOR'S
SPEuDING AooDUNTOF THE POWER OF DNA (1996)) (noting that wealthier criminal defen-
dants obtain expert consultants who routinely reveal flaws in prosecution expert's testimony).
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mg equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its
criminal law. 26' Absent the adversarial testing assumed byDxA- the Davt
standard collapses and fails. The prosecution, supported by state-sponsored
expert witnesses, is able to present the trial court with a one-sided case for
admission.67 The defense attorney representing an indigent client is left to
prepare for the D ert hearing by reading any available texts and reviewing the
materials provided bythe prosecution through discovery- materials that maybe
incomprehensible or of little value to a lawyer without a scientific background.
Lacking training in the relevant science, the trial judge as amateur scientist,
therefore, is presented onlywith the casefiradmission. The crucible of the court
envisioned bythe Dmdku majoritybecomes, in fact, a meaningless safeguard for
the indigent criminal defendant.2! "
Scholars note that judges routinelyadrnit prosecution expert testimonythat,
had it been properly subjected to adversarial testing, likely would have failed
J)kj
2 69 Unfortunately, this practice has been documented in capital cases! 70
Nevertheless, trial judges routinely deny lawyers' requests for expert services.
271
Presumably, such judges relyon defense counsel's abilityto challenge adequately
the prosecution's proffer through cross-examination. An uninformed cross-
examination of a proffered expert, however, is not sufficient for the Dault
266. G 351 US. at 19.
267. The likelihood of tainted science slipping past the gatekeeper is increased bythe fact that
"[t]oo manyexperts in the criminal justice system manifest a police-prosecution bias,* and because
"manyprosecutors seek out such (biased] experts." Paul C Giannel, 7heA haeofSdagcEid=
in ir Gses: The New lnf ic a OinLarzties, 4 VA J. Sor POL'Y&L 439, 441 (1997)
[hereinafter Giannelli, GmLaknrmtiriseeahoSapir &Giangnde, supra note 237, at 36 (discuss-
ing bias of prosecution expert witnesses).
268. SeeDad w 509 US. at 595-96.
269. See Giannelli, Cin' Latrtiis, supra note 267, at 442-50 (discussing expert testimony
admitted in criminal cases that courts should have deemed inadmissible under Dwav); if Robin
Mejia &Ian Sample, Bite dBsk NEWSaENTIST, April 20, 2002, at 4 (discussing recent studythat
concluded that chemical matching of ballistics, a practice long considered reliable and admissible
under Dadv~t is faulty and likely has led to numerous erroneous convictions).
270. SeeSCHECK,ETAL,spa note 254, at 158-71 (discussing 'junk science" that has tainted
capital convictions); Giamelli, Cird an iniz s"qr note 241, at 112-17 (discussing "unvalidated
expert testimony" that has led to capital convictions);seeahoChris Adams, Dead Watdx 10"Da
RowExaoezai, THE CHAMPION, June 2002, at 10 (describing case of Ray Krone, sentenced to
death based on unchallenged testimony of "bite mark expert"; DNA evidence later exonerated
Fortunately, the news is not all bad: many creative defense attorneys are using Dadu/t to
force judges to reconsider the admissibility of forensic evidence that courts have long deemed
admissible. See 6#6 note 304 and accompanying text.
271. See Giannelli, Gzd ardGim,~ s"qr note 241, at 111 (setting forth findings of studies




standard to function properly."' Simply put, a lack of adversarial testing at the
DWa 7hearing risks turning the indigent defendant's day in court into a mean-
inless ritual.7
The Constitution's equality principle, however, mandates that the govern-
ment take affirmative steps to minimize the disparity of resources facing indigent
criminal defendants whose povertymerelyhas limited- as opposed to prohibited
absolutely- their ability to present claims and defenses.2"4 Thus, although the
lack of expert consultation does not preclude absolutely the indigent defendant
from mounting a challenge to the prosecution's proffered testimony, it does limit
the effectiveness of any challenge.27 To paraphrase the D%@.v opinion: there
is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich
man enjoys the benefit of the expert consultant's examination into the prosecu-
tion's experts' materials, research into the proffered science, and marshalling of
arguments on his behalf, while the indigent defendant's lawyr is forced to sift
through unfamiliar scientific materials for himself.276 Although the equality
principle does not require the government "to place the poor on the same level
as those who can afford the best [expert assistance] available," 7' it does require
the government to take affirmative steps to alleviate the grossest effects of the
defendant's poverty. As noted byProfessor Bailey, "[B]ecause Akds roots are
based in fundamental fairness and equal protection, an indigent is entitled to an
adequate opportunityto present his claims fairlywithin the adversarysystem and
an opportunityto secure the basic tools of an adequate defense."271 The DauWirt
standard, premised onparityof resources between litigants and based on a model
of adversarial testing, simply does not function properly when one partyto the
litigation possesses vastly superior resources. Dauw, therefore, serves to
highlight the central premise of the equality principle: the American system of
justice is offended when a defendant, merely because of her indigency, is unable
272. SaeBennett, ssqm note 150, at 124 (notingthat'far too manycourts have focused... on
the defense counse's cross-examination of the prosecution's expert witness as a sulrs tia for the
defense receiving the use of its own exert .... [Too few] [c]ourts seem to read A ke generously
in the area of providing... experts to help [defense counsel] prepare for cross-examination").
273. Da, 372 US. at 358.
274. Ses"qr notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
275. q. Da&, 372 US. at 357.
276. Id at 357-58 ('There is lacking that equality demanded bythe Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the
record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent... is
forced to shift for himself."). A similar result could be reached in the federal system pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment. SeeBoiling v. Sharpe, 347 US. 497,498-50 (1954).
277. Da&, 372 US. at 362-63 (harlan, J., dissenting); seaso Ross, 417 U.S. at 609; spm
notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
278. Bailey, spra note 5, at 404 (internal quotations, citations, and bracketed material omitted).
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to present fullyher case within the adversarial process. 9
A ke establishes the fact that when an indigent criminal defendant is able to
make a "threshold showing" that expert assistance would materially assist her in
the preparation of her defense and that the denial of such services would result
in a fundamentallyunfair trial, the Constitution requires that a trial court appoint
such an expert.28 Courts require a defendant seeking an A ke expert to make a
threshold showing that the need for the requested expert is more than merely
hypothetical;" courts reject defendants' requests for an Ake expert when the
defendant is unable to present anything other than generalized assertions that
expert assistance would be helpful282 Once the adversarial foundations of the
DuAwt standard are understood and the assumptions of the Dauben majority are
made clear, however, defense counsel can more easily surmount the "threshold
showing" required by A ke and obtain the necessary experts to challenge the
prosecution's experts and their underlying science.28
If the expert testimonybeing proffered bythe prosecution is anything other
than routine, the defense lawyer and the judge are unlikelyto possess a working
knowledge of the rationale undergirding the proffered testimony, let alone the
ability to determine "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid," and "whether that reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts in issue" in the particular case.284 The
prosecution, however, through its "access to the services of state, county, or
metropolitan crime laboratories" will, of course, have ample access to expert
assistance."8' Hence, the gatekeeper will be presented only with the case fir
admission. The Daubert standard, premised on adversarial testing and presenta-
tion of contraryviews, does not function properly when only one player in the
criminal litigation has access to the specialized knowledge that the DauLwt
standard requires. Because of this necessity for the presentation of contrary
views, the need for the requestedA keexpert is, therefore, absolutelynot "hypo-
thetical"; rather, the requestedAke expert is critical to a proper application of the
279. SeeAke,470US. at 77;Daz,372 U.S. at358; Grf 351 U.S. at 19.
280. SwA kA 470 US. at 82-83.
281. Seesu"m notes 143-148 and accompanying text (summarizing lower courts' treatment of
Ake's "threshold showing" requirement).
282. Sm, eg, Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th ar. 1999) (upholding trial judge's
refusal to appoint Akeexpert), wt dig 528 U.S. 1120 (2000); State v. Gonzales, 892 P.2d 838,
847 (Ariz. 1995) (en bane) (up holding trial court's rejection of defendant's request forA keexpert).
Seg mdy I4hrris, Trdt Sm!ir; su"ra note 48, at 487-88 (discussing difficuly of convincing trial
courts to appoint Akeexperts).
283. Giannelli & Imwinkelried, Fa/6tfnn Kumho, szra note 4, at 12, 19 (stating that
Daxdvff/Ktmr standard "should also affect motions for defense experts under Ak).
284. D=&4; 509 US. at 592-93.
285. Giannelli, Chd!iand inkAm, su"m note 241, at 110.
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Dau1vt standard. Thus, once the trial court properly understands that the
Daul, standard is premised on parity of resources and the presentation of
contraryviews, the indigent criminal defendant faced with a prosecution-initiated
Dauat hearing can show more easily the requisite "reasonable probability' that
an A ke expert would aid in her defense;2 6 in fact, once the trial court under-
stands the fundamental assumptions implicit in Dauben the defendant can show
that Daun requires that the trial court as gatekeeper have before it any compet-
ing views. 2 7
When the prosecution seeks to admit expert testimony and triggers the
Dau thearing, theA kedecision- premised on enabling all criminal defendants
to defend themselves within the confines of the adversarial system- suggests
that the trial court provide defense counsel with an expert to interpret the
findings of the government's expert witness and to aid defense counsel in the
preparation of the cross-examination of the prosecution's witness. This expert
as trial shield will educate defense counsel on the prosecution expert's underlying
science, will assist defense counsel in preparing the "vigorous" cross-examination
envisioned by Daulx, and, if need be, will testify and provide the "contrary"
views envisioned by the Dadv majority 8  A full and proper vetting of the
prosecution's expert by a defense awyer assisted by an expert consultant will
allow the trial court to become the well-educated gatekeeper that is crucial for a
proper functioning of Daulvt The failure to appoint such an expert, however,
will result in the preclusion of the adversarial testing upon which the Daubw
standard is based, thus rendering the judge's role as gatekeeper a nullity.
B. Sl#ingp Past the Ga
The Ake Expert and the Daubert Jury
"Now the important thing and the only important thing to notice is
that the expert has taken the jury's place if they believe Kim."28'
286. Seesqa notes 143-148 and accompanying text.
287. It also ilhsates the probable value of the additional safeguard- absent a defense
viewpoint at the Dzat admissibility hearing, the gatekeeper will have before it incomplete and
biased materials. SeA ke, 470 US. at 77 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319 (1976)); see aso
Giannelli, CirnLabrs, supra note 267, at 441 (arguing that "[t]oo manyexperts in the criminal
justice system manifest a police-prosecution bias"); Harris, Tnah Ski su"ma note 48, at 513
(setting forth studies and noting that "[wihile crime laboratories may cary the government's
imprimatur, they can and do produce flawed results'); Sapir & Giangrande, sra note 237, at 36
(discussing bias of government witnesses).
288. SeDaur , 509 US. at 596; seeabo Bailey, s"m note 5, at 441 (discussing A ke expert as
trial shield).
289. Learned Hand, HistriadiaPraa Cmi&a67im RqmftiExpat Teisnrq 15 HARV.
L. REV. 40,52 (1901).
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As noted above in Part V, the Dauxet Court recognized that erroneous or
shaky science will occasionallyslip past the trial judge as gatekeeper and make its
wayto the jury. The DxAdn Court, therefore, expected the jury system to act
as the gatekeeper's backup and reject such faultyscience; the Court assumed that
the party who failed to preclude the admission of the testimony at the Dauert
hearing would present the jurywith sufficient evidence to allowit to discredit and
reject the "shaky" but admitted testimony.29 Implicit in Dau1mn's reliance on the
jury as corrector of the gatekeeper is the notion that the party who lost on
admissibilitywill have access to the assistance that will enable it to assist the jury
in rejecting shaky or erroneous science.
Again, the Daubett Court's reliance on the jury system was understandable
in the context of the civil system in which the Court announced its standard; the
typical civil attorney has access to expert witnesses and consultation.292 As the
Ake decision made apparent, however, the typical indigent criminal defendant
does not have access to the very mechanism the Daube~t Court relied on when it
lauded the "capabilities of the jury."2" Simplyput, due to lackof access to expert
consultation, the testing of the prosecution's experts in front of the jurydoes not
often take place in the world of indigent criminal defense.29 This testing is
290. Dadt, 509 US. at 5%;seeasosqira notes 230-253 and accompanying text. Badscience
might slip by the gatekeeper because the judge came to an erroneous conclusion at the DwAut
hearing. SwJASANOFF, sum note 170, at 5 ("Lacking adequately trained gateleepers, the lea
system allows itself, in the view of some critics, to be swamped by 'junk science.'). Moreover, t
Dault opinion implied that even if the trial court comes to the "correct" determination regarding
the proffered testimonys admissibility at the Dauba hearing, the science nevertheless may be
erroneous or faulty. In other words, some borderline, shaky, or even erroneous science passes the
Dahm standard and should, therefore, be admitted for the jurys consideration. SDau1 509
US. at 596.
291. SwDxeWn; 509 US. at 596; .Viglantes"pra note 7, at 580-82 (recognizing that expert
testimony is crucial if jury is to come to correct understanding of scientific issues).
292. Swsupra notes 248-252 and accompanying text. In fact, the civil attorneys veryaas to
expert witnesses might constitute a problem with the Dardmt Court's reliance on the jury system
to reject erroneous science. Pundits argue that in the civil context, expert witnesses are merely
"hired guns"- wel-spoken, well-credentialed individuals who can pass off erroneous science as
accurate before a jurycomposed of laypeople. Sw Giannelli, Crind Cbini s"pra note 241, at
117; seeasoJASANOFF, supm note 170, at 5 (noting that parties to civil litigation often hire experts
who present "extreme and unrepresentative opinios about the technical issues at stake"); Vigilante,
suqm note 7, at 555-56 lamenting that "hired gun testimonycan negatively affect the outcome of
jury deliberations).
293. SwDadu/t, 509 US. at 596 (rejecting concerns of amici and respondent Merrell Dowandnoting that "respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and
of the adversary system generally').
294. Sw eg, JOHN C. TLKKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF QUME AND
PUI.SHMENr 75-77 (1997) (describing perfunctory cross-examination of prosecution expert in
capial murder case). In the case analyzed byTucker, the court-appointed defense lawyr "did not
talk to any hair expert, or have any of (the prosecution expert's] results checked byanother expert.
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preciselywhat the DauLwt Court relied upon to guard against bad science tainting
the legal process.
Moreover, research suggests that when confronted with complex, technical
testimony, the average jury is usually "willing to defer to the guidance of a
testifying expert."" If, however, only one side of the litigation is able to retain
expert assistance, the jury will have only one expert opinion to which it can
defer.' The jury, therefore, will lack the knowledge and information required
to make rational and reasoned determinations rearding expert testimonyand the
Dairt Court's reliance on the jury as a fail-safe mechanism to prevent shaky,
erroneous, or overstated science from tainting the legal process will be proven
unfounded.
297
As is true in the Dadvt hearing, however, the equalityprinciple and the A ke
doctrine provide a framework for rectifying this imbalance. The A ke expert as
trial shield can assist the indigent defendant's law}er in preparing an adequate
cross-examination and can allowthe assumptions of the DauxnCourt to become
a reality.29' This expert can interpret the testimony of the prosecution's expert,
can point out any flaws in the expert's testimony, and can empower the indigent
defendant's lawyerto conduct the type of vigorous cross-examination the Dsu1vt
Court assumed would transpire. Thus, even if the gatekeeper admits the shaky
or faulty testimony- as the Dxdt Court admitted it occasionally would- the
Dauzvt Court's reliance on the jury as the gatekeeper's corrector and rejecter of
bad science will be realized.
Junk science is not the only concern. Much prosecution expert testimony
is based on "good science." DNA evidence for instance, although generally
recognized to be accurate in theory, can be overstated by a prosecution expert,
especially when one concedes that "many experts in the criminal justice sytem
manifest a police-prosecution bias."'" The unrebutted testimony of a prosecu-
tion expert that a DNA sample "matches" a particular defendant needs to be
IHis preparation for the cross-examination of [the prosecution expert witness] on the crucial hair and
blood testimony was to read articles about hair and blood evidence.* Id at 77; see aso Sapir &
Giangrande, s"pra note 237, at 34 (describing superficial cross-examinations of prosecution experts
conducted by defense lawyers).
295. Vigilante, ss"ra note 7, at 554.
296. Moreover, when the defense falls to challenge adequately the prosecution expert's
testimony, the ju y may assume that the defense does not care to contest that part of the state's
case .... Worse still, the y may assume that the defense dd have its own evidence on the issue
but declined to prsent it because it supported the state, not the defendant.' Harris, Tnab Sa/ig
spm note 48, at 502. In other words, the jury will penalize the indigent defendant for failing to
present a challenge that she was financially unable to mount-
297. S !nde 509 US. at 596.
298. Sers" notes 102-107 and accompanying text (discussing Ake expert as trial shield).
299. Giannelli, CGimLahjmaia , sxpra note 267, at 441.
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placed in its proper perspective. In addition, although the general scientific
theory being employed bythe government's expert maybe accurate, the expert
mayhave employed it in an incorrect or sloppyfashion; even an expert acting in
good faith pursuant to "good" science mayproduce flawed results.", At bottom,
regardless of which partyis,roffering the evidence, a jury"should view scientific
evidence with skepticism." 'Absent the presentation of the "contraryevidence"
assumed bythe Daubdyt Court, however, the jurywill not be empowered to view
expert testimony with this requisite critical eye."° In other words, without the
adversarial testing envisioned bythe Dau/dt Court, the jurywill have little choice
but to accept overstated or flawed scientific testimony as fact.
Absent anAkeexpert, the vigorous cross-examination and presentation of
contraryviews envisioned bythe Dxa&t Court simplywill not occur. Absent the
vigorous cross-examination of the prosecution's experts, the jury will be pre-
sented with a one-sided case as to the accuracy of scientific evidence- a result
highly conducive to a guilty verdict. Absent the presentation of contrary evi-
dence, the jury is likely to accept the prosecution expert's testimony wholesale.
The prosecution's expert- unchallenged and unopposed- will have taken the
jury's place as factfinder 3
VII. Cnaion
The DauXt standard can actually be a boon to the criminal defense lawyer
provided with the correct resources. Creative defense attorneys are using Dxun
to force judges to reconsider the admissibilityof evidence long deemed admissi-
ble. The Dauzvt Court, by removing from the scientific community the ability
to deem scientific and technical evidence admissible or inadmissible and placing
the ultimate admissibility determination in the hands of the legal profession, has
provided defense attorneys with a wonderful oppo nity to challenge forensic,
scientific, and technical evidence that has gained general acceptance and has long
been considered admissible in criminal courtrooms.3°4
300. SeeHarris, ThnbSedi s"'anote 48, at 513 (noting that '[w]hile crime laboratories may
carrythe government's imprimatur, theycan and do produce flawed results"); Sapir &Giangrande,
ssra note 237, at 34 n.203 (seting forth findings of studies revealing that government crime
aboratories frequently conduct inadequate and erroneous forensic wor0.
301. Harris, Tnmd Saei s"ma note 48, at 513.
302. SeeDadu/ 509US.at596.
303. Seff-and, s,2ynote 289, at52 (warning lawyers that unreburted expert wiess can usurp
jur's role as f acrer); Vigilante, s"n, note 7, at 591 (noting that "[d]ue to the complexityof their
testimony and status as 'expets'... [an expert witness] can often usurp the fact finding role of the
Wun).
304. Se Giannelli & Imwinkelried, Falk/finm Kumho, s"pra note 4, at 15-18 (discussing
defense attorneys'recentDaduetchallenges to prosecution expert testimonyregarding handwriting
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Manylawyers representing indigent defendants are able to secure adequate
expert assistance; in the federal courts, the CriminalJustice Act of 1964 has made
expert assistance a reality for federal public defenders and federal panel
attorneys. 305 Moreover, some state statutory schemes provide adequate expert
services for indigent defendants.'0 In addition, some state legislatures allow the
various public defender agencies themselves to administer funds and determine
when expert assistance will be used.3  Furthermore, some trial judges are willing
to appoint expert assistance to indigent defendants, whether pursuant to A ke or
to a statutory scheme.3"' Defendants prosecuted in such courts are able to
subject the prosecution's experts to the crucible of adversarial testing assumed
comparisons, hair comparisons, firearm identifications, and bite-mark identifications); see aso
A. Tobin &Wayne Duerfeldt, HowPbritdwis G Bde L adA rdyis?, OwvLJLsT.,
Fall 2002, at 26, 29-30 (discussing recent Davt challenges to comparative bullet lead analysis, a
process long considered reliable). Byway of example, within the last war defense attorneys have
brought into question whether fingerprint evidence, long considered reliable and admissible, passes
muster under DaudMt In fact, in Unitai atz v LlerPLaa Judge Louis Pollak, United States
District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, agreed with defense counsel that the
prosecution's proffered fingerprint evidence flunked the Daxde standard. See Adrian Cho,
Figpyi C DosntHdd Upas a Sde in Cwn, 295 SEIENCE 418, 418 (2002) (discussing Liw
P/ara case). Judge Pola however, ultimatelyretracted his ruling. See United States v. Llera-Plaza,
188 F. Supp. 2d 549,575-76 (ED. Pa. 2002) (retracting earlier opinion and holding that fingerprint
evidence passes Dwier standard); see wao Adrian ChojuApRewss Deiian nFirpi3r mEze,
295 SCIENCE 2195, 2195-96 (2002). Nevertheless, the issue of the admissibility of fingerprint
evidence under Daetw is not le to go away anytime soon. Seeeaffy Robert Epstein, Fire'
pritsMarDaubert: 7heM)thjFuep irt "Sde&=r"iRe;Rm, 75S. CALL.REv. 605 (2002) (arguing
that fingerprint testimony does not pass Ddatd standard and discussing recent court challenges
mounted bydefense lawYrs).
305. See 18 US.C. 5 3006A(a)(2000) (providing expert assistance for indigent criminal
defendants in federal system). Bit see Weinstein, sra note 253, at 1008 (arguing that Criminal
Justice Act sets monetary limits on defense expert remuneration that "must be increased if due
process is to be afforded defendants"). See pvurdy GIANmUJ & IMWMNELRIED, SQENMC
EVIDENCE, su note 103, at S 4-3 (analyzing terms and effectiveness of Criminal Justice Act);
Bennett, su"r note 150, at 126-32 (discussing whether Criminal Justice Act adequately secures
expert assistance for indigent criminal defendants); Edward C Prado, Pbmss anitug" ReieUig
dxcinimlJsweAc, LAW&CONTEMP.PROBs.,Wmter 1995, at 51 (discussing terms, background,
and effectiveness of CAminal Justice Act).
306. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, SCENtIFIC EVIDENCE, s"qra note 103, at S 4-4
(analyzing state statutory schemes providing for expert assistance); Bennett, s"r note 150, at 132-
33 (discussing state statutes that provide indigent defendants with expert assistance).
307. S eg, Bryan L Dupler, The Unwnm Law Im ri) Exearivz, and Qklacrm C,iimi
1hmioe 55 OKLA L REV. 1, 35 (2002) (discussing Oklahoma statute that allows "public-defense
agencies to administer the funds and make their own determinations of when expert... assistance
will be used in a particular case"). See mualyBennett, s"m note 150, at 132-33 (noting that some
state legislatures permit public defender agencies to distribute expert funds, collecting statutes).




and required by DWAu both at the initial admissibility hearing and before the
jury.
Unfortunately, manydefense lawyers lack access to such expert assistance.3°9
Such lawyers are unable to utilize the Dauvt standard to mount the type of
challenges noted above. 10 More fundamentally, this lack of defense access to
expert assistance enables government attorneys to introduce tainted expert
testimony and to secure guilty verdicts based upon such faulty testimony.
Unfortunately, failing to realize the assumptions of the Dau t Court, trial judges
often refuse to appoint the expert assistance needed for a proper functioning of
the liberalized Daubm standard.
Once the assumptions and adversarial foundations of the Da,&nr Court are
understood, however, defense counsel can more easilysunnountA kes threshold
showing. A proper understanding of the right guaranteed byAke, combined
with a full understanding of the assumptions and requirements of the DauLt
standard, can enable defense counsel to secure more easilythe expert assistance
that is required to ensure that the indigent defendant's right to trial does not
become a meaningless ritual"' A broader conception of the relationship be-
tween the Ake and Daidvi cases will assist counsel in ensuring due process for
all individuals accused of crimes, regardless of such individuals' wealth or pov-
erty.
309. SeGiann ilOan/ ,g swma note 241, at 111 (se forth findings of several
studies that analyzed indigent defense counsels' ability to retain statfunded expert assistance);
Harris, Ake RP-iiw.ssqrnote 84, at 780 (commenting that manyindigentdefendants lackadequate
access to expert assistance); V4,-k su/a note 251, at 391-94 (outlining indigent defender services'
lack of access to expert consultation and witnesses).
310. Sees note 304. Moreover, some judges, when presented with a prosecution proffer
of technical or scientific testimony, fal to conduct a Duot hearing and relyinstead on precedent.
Se Shuman, s"q. note 243, at 282-83 (noting that some courts rely on precedent, rather than
vigorous application of Dawtstandad, when anabming admissibikyof expert testimonyproffered
by prosecution).
311. Dcz6, 372 US. at 358.
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